Smartphone Data Transfer Protection According to Jurisdiction Regulations by Eskandari, Mojtaba
DEPARTMENT OF INFORMATION ENGINEERING AND COMPUTER SCIENCE
ICT International Doctoral School
University of Trento, Italy
Smartphone Data Transfer
Protection According to
Jurisdiction Regulations
Mojtaba Eskandari
Advisor
Prof. Bruno Crispo, Universita` degli Studi di Trento, Italy.
Co-Advisor
Dr. Anderson Santana de Oliveira, SAP Labs, Mougins, France.
Examiners
Prof. Francesco Bergadano, Universita` degli Studi di Torino, Italy.
Prof. Luigi Vincenzo Mancini, Sapienza-Universita` di Roma, Italy.
Dr. Roberto Carbone, Fondazione Bruno Kessler, Trento, Italy.
Submission: 31st January 2017, Revision: 24th June 2017, Defense: 3rd July 2017

Abstract
The prevalence of mobile devices and their capability to access high speed
Internet have transformed them into a portable pocket cloud interface. The
sensitivity of a user’s personal data demands adequate level of protection
in the cloud. In this regard, the European Union Data Protection regula-
tions (e.g., article 25.1) restricts the transfer of European users’ personal
data to certain locations. The matter of concern, however, is the enforce-
ment of such regulations. Since cloud service provision is independent of
physical location and data can travel to various servers, it is a challenging
task to determine the location of data and enforce jurisdiction policies.
In this dissertation, first we demonstrate how mobile apps mishandle
personal data collection and transfer by analyzing a wide range of popular
Android apps in Europe. Then we investigate approaches to monitor and
enforce the location restrictions of collected personal data. Since there are
multiple entities such as mobile devices, mobile apps, data controllers and
cloud providers in the process of collecting and transferring data, we study
each one separately. We introduce design and prototyping of a suitable
approach to perform or at least facilitate the enforcement procedure with
respect to the duty of each entity.
Cloud service providers, provide their infrastructure to data controllers
in form of virtual machines or containers; therefore, we design and imple-
mented a tool, named VLOC, to verify the physical location of a virtual
machine in cloud. Since VLOC requires the collaboration of the data con-
4troller, we design a framework, called DLOC, which enables the end users
to determine the location of their data after being transferred to the cloud
and probably replicated. DLOC is a distributed framework which does not
need the data controller or cloud provider to participate or modify their
systems; thus, it is economical to implement and to be used widely.
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Introduction
The popularity of mobile devices has grown drastically in the last decade.
International Data Corporation (IDC) reported 1.43 billion smartphone
shipments in 2015 and anticipated a steady rise to 1.92 billion in 2020 [77].
In Europe alone, according to the Ericsson ConsumerLab’s report, there
were 475 million user subscriptions in 2014 and this number is estimated
to reach 815 million subscriptions in 2020 [31].
Smartphones often store personal data such as contacts, financial infor-
mation, photos, location, etc. Essentially, “personal data” refers to any in-
formation relating to an identified or identifiable natural person, i.e., data
subject [76]. It is a common practice for mobile apps to collect, process
and transfer personal data to back-end servers (cloud) for further process-
ing and storage. Cloud service provisioning usually is independent of the
service provider’s location; thus, it raises the issue of identifying in which
jurisdiction, personal data is stored and processed. Data protection regula-
tions, such as article 25.1 of the European Union Data Protection Directive
(DPD’25.1) [76, 44], restrict personal data transfer to particular jurisdic-
tions. DPD’25.1 prohibits the transfer of personal data to any country
that does not ensure an adequate level of protection. This principle drove
the creation of the EU-US Safe Harbor agreement in July 2000 [34].
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Years later, an Austrian privacy activist, Maximillian Schrems, sued
Facebook Ireland claiming that the company made his personal informa-
tion available to the US intelligence agencies without any consent or no-
tification [16]. As consequence of that filed case, the European court of
Justice decided to invalidate the Safe Harbor agreement [24]. This decision
caused numerous debates on the legal aspects of transferring and process-
ing European Citizens’ personal data to outside the European Economic
Area (EEA) [6, 94].
In February 2016, the European Commission and the United States
agreed on a new framework for transatlantic data flows, the EU-US Pri-
vacy Shield [23]. The new arrangement imposes stronger obligations on
companies in the US in order to protect the European users’ personal data.
Moreover, it provides more robust monitoring and enforcement mechanism
that allows the European users to raise any inquiry or complaint in this
context with a dedicated new Ombudsman.
However, the major problems are: a) lack of an enforcement mechanism
for jurisdiction regulations on both server side and mobile devices; b) there
is no analysis system to monitor the data collection and data transfer
practices of mobile apps.
1.1 Motivation and Problem Statement
Since data is a passive entity and can be easily replicated and transferred
through network, tracking its physical location and enforcing jurisdiction
regulations require a robust and widespread monitoring system observing
the entire network.
Cloud service providers (CSPs) serve multiple consumers using a multi-
tenant model by dynamically assigning resources on consumers’ demand [63].
There are multiple roles in a cloud service provision scheme which we use
2
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in this text. Data Processor refers to the entity which provides cloud in-
frastructure. Data Controller is an entity (usually an organization) which
collects data from individuals (users) and process them in cloud using the
infrastructure provided by Data Processor. Data Subject indicates an en-
tity/person about whom the data is collected and processed by the Data
Controller.
Since the cloud services are consumed over the Internet, they are inde-
pendent of the location of the provider. CSPs wish to be free to relocate
data for various purposes such as load balancing in order to reduce the
maintenance cost. However, knowing and controlling the physical location
of data for storage and processing is a key requirement for enforcement
of the jurisdiction regulations. Moreover, it could be very important for
an organization (i.e. data controllers) using cloud in some particular sce-
narios dealing with compliance [3]. Due to lack of appropriate monitoring
mechanisms, personal data may be transferred amongst various data cen-
ters situated in different jurisdictions, and consequently it might lead to
violations in data privacy as there are various data protection regulations
in different countries.
This dissertation mainly focuses on providing demonstration of compli-
ance as the violation from jurisdiction regulations significantly impacts on
engaged businesses. For instance, the EU General Data Protection Reg-
ulation (EU GDPR) imposes considerable fines (up to 4% of the global
annual turnover) to organizations that fail to comply with the new frame-
work effective in May 2018 [71]. Two of the most important points of the
regulation features are new responsibilities for data processors and new
constraints of trans-border data flows, in particular with the emergence of
a new EU-US agreement on the topic, the Privacy Shield, replacing the
Safe Harbor agreement.
It is necessary to understand how personal data is mishandled, identify
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the major barriers and introduce an approach to enforce the regulations on
data collection/process. The first step is to analyze the most used mobile
apps in order to observe their data collection practices and the ways they
handle personal data transfer. The second step is to study the feasible
approaches to handle properly the collected personal data according to the
data protection regulations. Since there are multiple entities playing role in
this procedure, it is crucial to design the observation and the enforcement
routines for each entity separately. In other words, how to make the whole
set of entities compliant with the data transfer regulations. As cloud service
providers, provide their infrastructure to the data controllers in forms of
virtual machines or containers, in order to maintain the compliance, data
controllers are required to monitor the location of their virtual machines
in cloud. The last step is to determine the location of data after being
transferred to the cloud from a user’s smartphone. This procedure must
be independent of the cloud provider or the data controller.
1.2 Research Challenges and Contributions
In the enforcement of jurisdiction policies on mobile devices (e.g. Arti-
cle 25.1 of EU DPD) we need to find the answers of the following research
questions:
• RQ1. How much and what type of personal data is collected by mobile
apps, currently?
• RQ2. What are the locations of the remote servers to which the col-
lected personal data is transferred?
• RQ3. How many of the popular apps used in the EEA, violate Euro-
pean Data protection regulations on the data transfer restriction?
• RQ4. How such regulation can be enforced on users’ devices?
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• RQ5. What is the most effective and practical solution to verify the
location of a virtual machine in cloud even if the cloud provider is not
collaborative?
• RQ6. While maintaining the present-day underlying cloud services
and infrastructures, how an end-user can track the location of her
data in cloud from her smartphone?
1.2.1 App Analysis for Data Location Investigation (RQ1-3)
Understanding the data collection and data transfer practices of mobile
apps requires the analysis of data-flow from where the data is generated
to where it is stored in a remote server. We need to infer whether a user’s
personal data leaves the boundary of the app and to identify the geograph-
ical location of the data recipient. Transferring personal data consists of a
data flow between the framework APIs called to access personal informa-
tion and the APIs that provide potential transfer points; such as network,
files, log, etc. Code analysis is able to determine some of such data flows;
however, due to code obfuscation, reflection, and dynamic code loading,
which are widely used in mobile apps, static analysis fails to completely
cover the code. Instead, dynamic analysis is able to cover those dynamic
parts of the code if a proper triggering mechanism is used.
We design and develop a tool named PDTLoc which inspects mobile
applications and extracts information about the collected personal data
and the jurisdictions of the remote servers to which the data is transferred.
As use case we investigate the current state of the privacy protection of the
European smartphone users with regard to DPD’25.1, we used PDTLoc to
analyze the 1, 498 most popular apps in the EEA. We obtained evidence
confirming that 16.5% (that is 242 apps), transfer data outside the EEA
without user consent. This signifies that these apps collect and transfer
5
1.2. CHALLENGES AND CONTRIBUTIONS CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
personal data to servers located outside the EEA escaping the control of
a data protection framework (e.g., Safe Harbor), thus violating the users’
data protection rights. We also analyzed the privacy policies provided by
the app developers. One striking finding is that 51% of the most used apps
in Europe do not provide any privacy policy. Furthermore, out the apps
providing a privacy policy, only 53 apps (3.5% of all) had Safe Harbor cer-
tification, whose agreement was anyway declared invalid, as we mentioned
above. Perhaps the situation will be clarified when the EU-US Privacy
Shield framework will be finalized.
This work is published and to be presented in The 17th International
Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETS), 2017, Minneapo-
lis, USA [32].
1.2.2 Data Location Enforcement on Mobile Devices (RQ4)
Policy enforcement approaches on devices (particularly Android devices)
fall into three major categories. The first category consists of modifying the
Android framework in order to insert monitoring modules at key interfaces
to enable the interception of data collection and data transfer activities as
they occur on the device [64, 14, 28, 47, 13, 45, 30]. The problem is that
such approaches require extensive modification to the operating system
which leads to significant usability issues and widespread adoption. The
second category involves decomposing the applications, injecting an inline
reference monitor into the code and repackaging it again [92, 53, 25, 52, 10].
The major issue with these approaches is that they are not able to cover
the code completely due to dynamic features of the code such as reflection,
dynamic code loading, native code, and obfuscated/encrypted code. The
third does not need to modify the framework or instrumenting the app
code. It hooks the APIs at runtime in order to allow the monitoring of the
data collection and data transfer activities of the app.
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We design a module on top of Xposed framework [91] which intercepts
the APIs transferring data to remote servers and analyzes their destination
location by using the service provided by PDTLoc. This module then
enforces the given jurisdiction policies on the device at the run time.
1.2.3 Verify the Location of a Virtual Machine in Cloud (RQ5)
Once personal data is transferred to a remote server, the user (data subject)
has no control over it. Data controllers have to comply with the data pro-
tection regulations; however, cloud service providers (CSPs) wish to be free
to relocate data among their data centers for multiple purposes including
load balancing, energy consumption optimization, reducing maintenance
cost, etc. Since CSPs have control over the infrastructure and the net-
work traffic of virtual machines running the data controllers’ services, it is
quite challenging to verify the location of the virtual machine from inside
the cloud. Therefore, there are a number of approaches which perform
such verification by employing a widespread network of servers, referred as
landmarks [37]. They estimate distance by computing network latency of a
challenge message transmitted between each landmark and the server and
then determine the location of the server accordingly. There are two major
challenges here. First, the network measurements are not reliable due to
dynamic nature of the Internet. Second, a huge network of landmarks is
quite expensive to implement.
We have overcome these challenges by introducing VLOC (a Verifier
for physical LOCation of a virtual machine), which is able to verify the
physical location of a virtual machine by taking advantage of nearby ran-
domly chosen web-servers. Since VLOC does not rely on a network of fixed
landmarks, its implementation is simpler and requires far less maintenance
cost than other proposed solutions. VLOC is implemented as a software
component which is installed and initialized on a virtual machine.
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This work is published in IEEE 6th International Conference on Cloud
Computing Technology and Science (CloudCom), 2014, Singapore [33].
1.2.4 Distributed Data Tracking in Cloud (RQ6)
Cloud storage services such as Amazon S3, DropBox, or Google Drive al-
low users to store their data on remote servers independent of geographical
location. Cloud storage services utilize a federation schema by maintain-
ing data at different providers which then distribute and replicate the data
among different cloud storage providers. This reduces vendor lock-in and
increases data availability through additional redundancy which, at the
same time, can raise issues with data security and compliance requirements.
Particularly, such replication and transparent data distribution limit the
user’s direct control over data flows, leading to potential violations of data
transfer compliance constraints. In such scenario the cloud provider and
data controller are not willing to collaborate in compliance with the reg-
ulations. Therefore, they do not modify their underlying services in order
to enable monitoring the location(s) of data flow.
We already introduced a practical approach when data controller is
willing to collaborate by installing VLOC on their virtual machines. We
move one step forward and propose a framework, named DLoc, which does
not require a network of monitoring servers (dedicated landmarks) and
does not need to reside and running within the cloud. DLoc runs in a
distributed manner on a significant number of mobile phones, uses a proof
of data possession technique to guarantee that the cloud storage service
possesses a particular file and estimates the location of all copies of files
publicly available in the cloud.
This work is submitted to International Workshop on Data Privacy
Management. Springer International Publishing, 2017, Norway.
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1.3 Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation consists of the following chapters:
Chapter 2 proposes an analysis mechanism which addresses the issue
of transferring privacy related information collected by mobile apps. More-
over, it discusses the current state of privacy protection in mobile apps and
suggests a number of actions to improve the control over trans-border per-
sonal data flows (RQ1-3). Then it describes the enforcement of location
relevant policies for mobile apps’ end users. A third party service is un-
der development to analyze mobile apps and notify the user whether the
app is compliance with the given jurisdiction privacy policies. Finally we
introduce the on-device enforcement mechanism designed for jurisdiction
regulations (RQ4).
Chapter 3 continues the previous chapter with focusing on policy en-
forcement at the service provider’s side. Here, we introduce VLOC [33]
and its usage for data controllers (RQ5).
Chapter 4 introduces a distributed auditing approach for data tracking
in cloud (RQ6). As the presented approach neither needs a modification on
the server side or a huge network of landmark servers, it is quite economic
and practical to be implemented.
Chapter 5 describes that how the results of this dissertation in demon-
strating compliant privacy management practices impacts industry.
Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation by summarizing the chapters pre-
sented.
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Chapter 2
Analyzing Remote Server Locations
for Personal Data Transfers in
Mobile Apps
These days, smartphones are homes for a wide range of users’ personal
data and the apps running on them often use cloud servers for storage and
processing. The sensitivity of a user’s personal data demands adequate
level of protection at the back-end servers. We design and implement an
app analysis tool, PDTLoc (Personal Data Transfer Location Analyzer),
to detect and study the violation of the jurisdiction regulations.
2.1 Introduction
Several studies highlight that mobile applications actively collect and ex-
filtrate personal data from smartphones [2, 43, 29]. The main concern
here is how to enforce jurisdiction regulations such as DPD’25.1 in mo-
bile apps. As the first pace to tackle the problem, we design and imple-
ment PDTLoc (Personal Data Transfer Location Analyzer), which employs
both static and dynamic analysis techniques to infer whether the apps vi-
olate DPD’25.1. PDTLoc inspects mobile applications and extracts in-
11
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formation about the collected personal data and the jurisdictions of the
remote servers to which the data is transferred. In order to investigate the
current state of the privacy protection of the European smartphone users
with regard to DPD’25.1, we used PDTLoc to analyze the 1, 498 most
popular apps in the EEA. We obtained evidence confirming that 16.5%
(that is 242 apps), transfer data outside the EEA without user consent.
This signifies that these apps collect and transfer personal data to servers
located outside the EEA escaping the control of a data protection frame-
work (e.g., Safe Harbor), thus violating the users’ data protection rights.
We also analyzed the privacy policies provided by the app developers. One
striking finding is that 51% of the most used apps in Europe do not provide
any privacy policy. Furthermore, out the apps providing a privacy policy,
only 53 apps (3.5% of all) have Safe Harbor certification, whose agreement
was anyway declared invalid, as we mentioned above. Perhaps the situ-
ation will be clarified when the EU-US Privacy Shield framework will be
finalized.
Contributions:
• We design and implement PDTLoc, an Android app analysis tool that
employs a backward program slicing technique to detect DPD’25.1’s
violation by mobile apps [76].
• We collect a dataset of 1, 498 Android apps which are the most used
apps in the EEA. We analyze these apps using PDTLoc to investi-
gate the recipient server locations of the users’ personal data. To our
knowledge, this is the first study of the kind conducted so far.
• In order to demonstrate the gravity of the problem, we also analyze
the privacy policies of the apps in the dataset in order to check if the
data controller and the processing locations are clearly identified.
12
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2.2 Problem Statement
Let A = {a0, a1, a2, . . . , an} be a set of android apps. There is a jurisdic-
tion regulation denoted by R = {l0, l1, l2, . . . , lq}, which restricts ai ∈ A to
transfer data to particular locations i.e., l0...lq. Let S = {s0, s1, s2, . . . , sm}
be the set of all servers used by A to store and process data. Each sj ∈ S is
situated in a physical location indicated as slj. There is a T(a,s) function
showing the app a transfers personal data to the remote server s. For-
mally speaking, we have to enforce the regulation R on the set A by using
Equation 2.1:
∀ a ∈ A ∃ s | T(a, s)⇒ sl ∈ R (2.1)
The problem we solve is to determine, with a particular level of certainty,
whether ai ∈ A violates R. For each app, we have to discover the list of
the remote servers to which it transfers data; then, we need to find their
locations and match them against the allowed list, R, to discover violations.
In the analysis we perform in this work, the major goal is to expose the
status of privacy protection with respect to DPD’25.1 by the most popular
mobile apps in the EU. More specifically, we analyze the type of personal
data accessed by these apps, the number of apps that collect/transfer per-
sonal data to servers over the network, and the locations of the recipient
servers.
Caveat: In this work, we do not try to assert the compliance of the
apps but rather to detect if they are likely violating user’s privacy rights
concerning international data flows limited by the DPD’25.1.
2.3 Data Flow Analysis
The purpose of our data flow analysis is to understand how an app re-
trieves and transfers personal data. In the context of the problem, we need
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to infer whether a user’s personal data leaves the boundary of the app and
to identify the geographical location of the data recipient. Transferring
personal data consists of a data flow between the Android framework APIs
called to access personal information; such as device Id, location, contacts,
calendar, photos, etc., i.e., “source APIs”; and the APIs that provide po-
tential transfer points; such as network, files, log, etc. i.e., “sink APIs”.
Source and sink APIs are discussed in detail later in Section 4. An auto-
mated data flow analysis tool detects data flows between the source and
sink APIs. We can perform such analysis both statically, i.e., extracting
information from the bytecode/source code; and dynamically, i.e., running
an app on a device/emulator and monitoring its behavior. Here we describe
the fundamental concepts regarding static and dynamic analysis that form
the basis of our approach.
• Backward Program Slicing: In the bytecode representation of
a program, two types of data structures are used for storing and
performing operations on data, i.e., stack and register. Operations
are performed on stack or register variables using program instruc-
tions (I ). In this text, we use registers (r) as we perform analysis on
Android apps and Android is based on a register based virtual ma-
chine. Backward program slicing is a data flow analysis technique
that, with respect to a register r used at point P in a program, con-
siders all the instructions I that can be executed before P and have
a direct or indirect effect on the value of r at P. The combination
of r and P, a certain API call in our case, forms a slicing criterion,
whereas the set of instruction I that effect the value of r at P is called
a backward slice. For instance, Line 2–6 and Line 9 represent a back-
ward slice corresponding to the variable Sum used at Line 9 (Point P)
in Listing 2.1.
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Listing 2.1: Backward Slicing Example
1 ...
2 int i, sum , count;
3 i = 1;
4 sum = 0;
5 for( ; i != 50; i++){
6 sum += i;
7 count = count * 100 / i;
8 }
9 System.out.println( "Sum = " + Sum); // point P
As a backward slice usually starts from a sink API, an inspection of
a backward slice corresponding to a particular register, can provide
information about its source and, thereby, infer the data flow path
between the source and sink APIs. The source, here, is represented
by the API that retrieves the personal information and the sink is
represented by the API that transfers the information to the outside
world through the Internet.
Such data flow paths can also be inferred by other analysis techniques
outlined in the literature (Section 2.10), such as [8]. These techniques,
generally, identify access to sources of personal information and then
track its flow in the program. Since the basic motivation of this work is
to find the location of the recipients of personal information, starting
the analysis from the sink APIs yields a better performance by filtering
out the apps that do not transfer personal information to the outside
world. Therefore, we use backward program slicing and effectively
avoid analyzing those apps which might access personal data, but do
not send it outside.
• Dynamic Tracking: Dynamic analysis is the process of executing
an app and observing its behavior. Tracking the behavior exhibited
by an app at execution time, usually, involves monitoring the system
resources accessed by the app, such as file-system, network, telephony,
etc. Since, this work focuses on personal data transfer over the net-
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work, we monitor the outgoing traffic.
Both of these techniques, static and dynamic, come with their respective
pros and cons. Static analysis is able to reach all possible data flows in the
source code and not only those executed in a specific run of the app. On the
other hand, there are programming features, such as various types of code
and data obfuscation, reflection, and dynamic code loading, that yields
an incomplete result. Reflection is a programming feature that enables
apps to operate on strings, i.e., instantiate objects of a class, invoke its
methods and access/modify its fields where the class, method and field
names are represented by strings that may not be readily available for
a static analyzer[78]. Similarly, dynamic code loading allows an app to
extend its code base after installation[20]. Therefore, it is impossible for
a static analysis tool to fully analyze such cases of dynamic nature. On
the other hand, dynamic analysis is able to overcome these limitations in
many cases. However, the app must be executed to trigger the critical
data flows for dynamic analysis to capture sensitive behavior, which is
a challenge for dynamic analysis tools. There are limitations with each
technique; however, if combined, static and dynamic analysis techniques
can complement each other in designing a more effective data flow analysis
system.
2.4 PDTLoc
In order to effectively detect violation from DPD’25.1 in popular mobile
apps, we design PDTLoc, a tool that takes advantage of both static and
dynamic analysis. Two screen shots of PDTLoc’s web interface are pro-
vided in Figure 2.1 and a complete video demo can be found here: https:
//youtu.be/q7fSpq7knV4.
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(a) Analyzing (b) Results
Figure 2.1: Screen shots of DLoc where we can analyze a mobile app and explore the
analysis results.
2.4.1 Overview
Figure 2.2 shows an overview of the basic blocks and the workflow of PDT-
Loc. PDTLoc consists of three major modules: a static analysis, a dynamic
analysis, and a location investigator module. Both the static and the dy-
namic analysis modules take an .apk file; extract a list of accessed personal
data; and a list of server names, URLs and IP addresses to which the per-
sonal information is sent. The dynamic analysis module complements the
static module and it is only activated when the given app uses reflection.
The lists of URLs extracted by both the modules may wary due to different
nature of these analysis techniques. Therefore, we consider a union set of
both the lists.
The lists of URLs along with the identifiers of the respective personal
information, which is sent to these URLs, are stored in a repository for
further analysis. The Location Investigator module (shown in Figure 2.2)
reads URL/IP addresses from the repository and creates a list of the server
locations where the app sends the collected personal data.
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Figure 2.2: A general overview of PDTLoc.
2.4.2 Static Analysis Module
PDTLoc’s static analysis module, represented by module 1 in Figure 2.2,
takes an .apk file and extracts the URLs/IP addresses of the destination
servers. APK is an archive file format that represents the Android app and
contains all the compiled code and the compiled/raw resources. Android
apps are usually written in Java, compiled into Dalvik bytecode and then
all the compiled classes are packed into a classes.dex file. Therefore, we
have to analyze this file to understand the behavior of the app.
To analyze the classes.dex file, the static analysis module extracts
and translates it into Smali code by employing ApkTool [81]. Smali code
is a disassembled representation of the Dalvik bytecode [39]. We use Smali
disassembly over Java because the decompilation process is more prone to
be thwarted by obfuscation, whereas the disassembly is more resilient [79].
The Static Check component inspects the Smali code for the use of reflec-
tion in order to pass the app to the dynamic analysis module. The Back-
ward Slicer performs backward program slicing on the Smali files to dis-
cover the information flow to certain sink APIs. This component employs
an extension of SAAF (Static Android Analysis Framework for Android
apps) that is able to extract the backward slices corresponding to a given
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sink API [46].
Class Method Parameter
javax/net/ssl/SSLSocketFactory createSocket host, port
android/net/Uri parse uri
java/net/URL <init> *
java/net/Socket setRequestProperty key, value
org/apache/http/client/methods/HttpGet <init>, setURI uri
org/apache/http/client/methods/HttpPost <init>, setURI, setEntity uri
org/apache/http/client/methods/HttpPut <init>, setURI uri
java/io/OutputStream write *
java/io/Writer write *
Table 2.1: The sinks of personal information. (*: All possible parameters)
Table 2.1 lists the sink APIs along with the corresponding parameters
of interest used in our analysis. We carefully analyzed the lists of sink
and source APIs provided in the literature, such as [8, 85], and considered
only those sink APIs that take the name or IP address of a particular
server and transfer data to it. The Backward Slicer receives these APIs
in the form of an .xml file referred to as BackTrack Patterns (shortly
BT Patterns). A BT Pattern provides information about the API, such
as class name, method name, position of the parameter in the parameters
list and its type. For example, Listing 2.2 instructs the Backward Slicer to
backtrack parameter 0, which is of type Ljava/lang/String;, of setURI
method of class org/apache/http/client/methods/HttpPost. Similarly,
information about the rest of the APIs in Table 2.1 is also provided to the
Backward Slicer.
Listing 2.2: BT Pattern Example
1 <backtracking -pattern
2 active="true" class="org/apache/http/client/methods/HttpPost"
3 description="Apache HTTP POST" method="setURI" parameters="Ljava/lang/String;"
4 interesting="0" />
The Backward Slicer spots the position of a given BT pattern in the
Smali files, backtracks the target parameter and extracts the correspond-
ing code slice. A code slice contains all the code statements that have a
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Listing 2.3: Backward Slice Example
1 const -string v0 , "facebook.com"
2 sput -object p0 , Lcom/facebook/Settings;->facebookDomain:Ljava/lang/String;
3 sput -object v0 , Lcom/facebook/Settings;->facebookDomain:Ljava/lang/String;
4 sget -object v0 , Lcom/facebook/Settings;->facebookDomain:Ljava/lang/String;
5 const -string v0 , "https :// graph.%s"
6 ...
7 move -result -object v4
8 invoke -direct {v3, v4}, Ljava/net/URL;-><init >(Ljava/lang/String ;)V
direct/indirect impact the register holding the value of the target param-
eter. Listing 2.3 depicts an example of a backward slice corresponding to
the API java/net/URL;-><init>. Similar slices representing each of the
BT patterns are extracted in the form of BT report and provided to a Slice
Analyzer.
The Slice Analyzer component traverses the slices and extracts URLs/IP
addresses to which user’s personal data might be transferred. Its major role
is to analyze the slices for certain data extraction patterns that represent
access to personal data. A typical data extraction pattern consists of a
class name, a method name, and a parameter as listed in Table 2.2. This
list includes only the APIs provided by the framework, used to acquire a
user’s personal information. However, it does not consider other methods
of acquiring user personal data, such as data input through text fields or
that stored on files on the device, etc. At this stage, PDTLoc can only
guarantee the existence of such data flow paths and flags them suspicious
with respect to their potential violation of DPD’25.1. Finally, the Slice
Analyzer generates a mapping of the personal data accessed by the app
and the corresponding server-locations to which the app might transfer the
personal data, and stores it in a repository for further processing.
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Class Method Parameter Parameter example
android/content/ContentResolver query uri content://media/external/video/media
content://sms/inbox
content://com.android.browser/history
android/net/Uri parse uri
android/content/Context getSystemService name location
connection
wifi
netstats
batterymanager
android/telephony/TelephonyManager getAllCellInfo
getCellLocation
getDeviceId
getSimCountryIso
...
*
Table 2.2: The sources of personal information
2.4.3 Dynamic Analysis Module
We dynamically analyze the apps using reflection (around 90% of the apps
in this study) that can potentially conceal data flows when only statically
analyzed [95]. Therefore, based on the static checks, the PDTLoc’s dy-
namic analysis module, (module 2 in Figure 2.2), is activated in case of
the app making use of reflection. The dynamic analysis module utilizes a
number of tools provided as part of the Android SDK. It executes the given
app, monitors its network traffic, and captures the URLs/IP addresses to
which the personal data is transferred. It employs adb to manage the
dynamic analysis process that follows certain steps for each app:
• Launch the emulator and configure WiFi and GPS.
• Run the TCP-Dump tool to monitor the network traffic [80].
• Install the app and unlock the emulator.
• Launch the app with Monkey to stimulate it [38]. Monkey injects ran-
dom events into the app including touch, drag, type, change the screen
orientation, etc.
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• After completion of the execution, URLs/IP addresses and the param-
eters (i.e., the transmitted data) are extracted from the TCP-Dump,
stored in the repository and all the data is erased from the emulator
in order to make it ready for next app analysis.
This process is repeated for each app that uses reflection. Since the goal
of using the dynamic analysis is to complement the static analysis, the
results are stored in the repository as a union set of both the analysis
modules. The dynamic analysis module captures all those data flows (in-
cluding those involving in reflection, native code, dynamic code loading,
etc.) that are properly executed during the analysis run. In order to extract
the personal information traveling through those data flows, we analyzed
the URLs by looking for particular patterns like ‘‘lat=[\.\-0-9]*’’,
‘‘city=[a-Z]*’’, ‘‘deviceIds=[0-9]*’’, ‘‘macAddress=[0-9a-f]*’’,
etc.
2.4.4 Location Investigator
The fundamental purpose of PDTLoc is to analyze an app and tell if it
sends user’s personal data to servers hosted at locations outside the juris-
diction defined by the given policies, e.g., the EU DPD’25.1. Therefore, we
need to investigate the physical locations of the machines represented by
the extracted URLs/IP addresses. The PDTLoc’s third module is Location
Investigator (module 3 in Figure 2.2). This module reads the URLs/IP
addresses of the remote servers from the repository and determines their
physical locations. There are a number of online databases that bind IP
addresses (or server names) to their corresponding geographical locations.
We configure the Location Investigator to use IPaddressAPI.com [50]. The
Location Investigator retrieves the locations using this online IP-Location
service and reports a mapping of URLs and geographical locations. It also
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marks those locations which are outside the declared jurisdiction.
2.5 Empirical Analysis
This section describes the criteria and the procedure of dataset collection
followed by the experimental setup and the evaluation goals.
2.5.1 Dataset Collection
Since this work considers the analysis of the transfer of European users’
personal data outside the EEA as a case study (i.e., violating DPD’25.1),
we have targeted the popular mobile apps in the EEA. For the app se-
lection, we relied on AppFigures which is an app tracking platform that
monitors the downloads and sales of the apps from Google and Apple app
stores [7]. We downloaded AppFigures’s list of the 400 most popular apps
for each EEA state. We identified 1, 498 distinct android apps for the en-
tire EEA and downloaded them. We use android apps because they have
over 80% of the market share [49], also for the availability of analysis tools
and their simple downloading mechanism. However, we searched for the
apps in our list, on iTunes in order to check their availability for iOS. In
the dataset we have collected, 80% of apps are available for both Android
and iOS and 20% are available only for Android. Therefore, our research
results are meaningful to iOS users as well; assuming the destination cloud
servers are the same for both OS, which is reasonable.
We developed a fully automated tool, named GTAD (Google Play Top
Apps Downloader), which crawls Google play store, identifies the popular
apps and downloads them. GTAD can also be configured to download a
custom list of apps; therefore, it downloads the apps that we need for this
experiment. Moreover, GTAD collects additional information about each
app including title, download hits, ratings, category, description, developer
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website and email, privacy policy link if available, etc.
2.5.2 GTAD
Figure 2.3 illustrates the four major modules of GTAD. The “Crawler”
module annotated by 1 queries Google Play store for the list of the top
apps. Google by default shows only 540 of top apps1 while this number is
not enough for performing experiments in large scale. We realize that if
we query Google Play store for top apps based on category, we can have
maximum 600 apps per category and since there are about 50 categories,
we can find a significant number of top apps.
The crawler module queries Google Play website and parses the received
HTML page. It extracts the apps package names and adds them into the
“Apps List”. Please note that since package name is unique, we use it as
a unique key to store and retrieve data.
The second module, “App Info Extractor” indicated by 2 , receives the
app package names from the list and queries Google Play website for that
app. It extracts the information provided in the app’s page including the
title and the logo of the app, category and subcategory, number of reviews,
user rates/score, number of downloads/installs, developer’s organization,
website and email, the link to the privacy and policy of the app if there is
any, published date, and the description of the app. This module requires
a set of regular expressions in order to find and extract the proper informa-
tion from the given HTML pager. The used regular expressions are listed
in Listing 2.4.
The third module is “APK Downloader” which reads the “Apps List”
and download them from Google Play. Google Play provides a set of APIs
used to authenticate the user and her device and then download the re-
1https://play.google.com/store/apps/collection/topselling_free
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Figure 2.3: A general overview of GTAD.
Listing 2.4: Regular expressions used to extract information about the apps from Google
Play website
1 title : r’<div class="id -app -title "[^ <]* >([^ <]*) <\/div >’
2 logo : r’<img class="cover -image "[^ >]*src ="([^"]*) "[^>]*>’
3 category: r’<a class="document -subtitle category" href ="\/ store\/apps\/ category \/([^"]*?)
">’
4 subcat : r’<a class="document -subtitle category "[^>]*>[^<]*< span [^ >]* >([^ <]+) <\/span >+’
5 numOfReviews: r’<span class="reviews -num "[^ >]* >([0 -9\. ,\s]*) <\/span >’
6 score : r’<div class=" score "[^>]*>([0-9.,\s]*) <\/div >’
7 maxDownloads: r’<div class=" content" itemprop =" numDownloads ">[0-9\.,\s]*\ -([0 -9\. ,\s]*)
<\/div >’
8 org : r’<div class="title">[\s]* Offered [^<]*<\/div >[^<]*<div class =" content " >([^<]*) <\/
div >’
9 devLink : r’<a class="dev -link" href ="[^"]* url\?q=([^"]*) \&amp;sa=D[^"]*"[^ >]* >[^ <]* <\/a>
’
10 devEmail: r’<a class="dev -link" href=" mailto :([^"]+) "[^>]* >[^<]* <\/a>’
11 policyLink: r’<a class ="dev -link" href=" mailto :[^"]+"[^ >]* >[^ <]* <\/a>[\s]*<a class="dev -
link" href ="[^"]* url\?q=([^"]*)&amp;sa=D[^"]*"[^ >]* >[^ <]* <\/a>’
12 datePublished: r’<div[^>]* class =" content "[^>]* itemprop =" datePublished ">([0-9a-zA-Z\.,\s
]*) <\/div >’
13 desc : r’<div[^>]* itemprop =" description "[^ >]* >(.+?) <\/div >’
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quested app. We use a python tool, called gplaycli 2, to download an
APK file from Google Play. Since Google only permits to download the
apps compatible with the user’s device, GTAD enables us to define as
many devices as we need in order to guarantee the APK download. If the
APK Downloader module fails to download an app, it automatically tries it
with the next device profile until having a successful download. Moreover,
GTAD is able to use an FTP server for storing the downloaded information
and the APK files.
2.5.3 Experimental Setup
As PDTLoc consists of a static and a dynamic analysis module, we designed
the experiment in such a way to know the results from both modules sep-
arately as well as their combined results. The static module analyzes all
the apps in the dataset, whereas the dynamic module analyzes those apps
which pass the static reflection check.
Static analysis module configuration: This module analyzes all
1, 498 downloaded .apk files. We used a desktop computer with an Intel
Core i5 3.20 GHz CPU and 8 GB memory running Ubuntu 15.10 for
the analysis. The static analysis took roughly 38 hours on this machine.
Dynamic analysis module configuration: The dynamic module
analyzes those apps that are marked for the use of reflection. We call it
Auto-Dynamic as it uses Monkey to stimulate the apps. It employs Android
Lollipop 5.0.1 on its emulator and the Monkey tool is configured to inject
700 random events into each app. We executed the experiment on the same
machine and it took about 6 days to analyze all the given apps.
2https://github.com/matlink/gplaycli
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2.5.4 Evaluation Goals
The experiments are designed to answer the following research questions:
• RQ1. Accessed Data: What are the types of personal data ac-
cessed/collected by the apps?
• RQ2. Data Transfer: What are the locations of the remote servers
to which the collected personal data is transferred?
• RQ3. DPD’25.1 Violation: How many of the popular apps used
in the EEA, violate DPD’25.1? Notice that there may be exceptions
where transfers outside of the EEA are authorized, such as Binding
Corporate Rules [22]. Data subjects need to be informed about the
adoption of such legal mechanisms, through the terms of service and
privacy policy. We took this in consideration when considering viola-
tions, looking for information about the agreements and certifications
by the app developer when available.
2.6 Results and Discussions
We analyzed statically all 1, 498 apps and out of these apps, 1, 472 (98%)
apps use reflection; therefore, we analyzed them also dynamically.
This section reports the analysis results and discusses them in the light
of the consequent privacy concerns. The supporting data, the full list
of the analyzed apps and the study’s conclusions are accessible via this
link: http://titan.disi.unitn.it/pdtloc/.
2.6.1 Personal Data Accessed
Pieces of personal data stored on a user’s device are categorized into three
broader groups as shown in Table 2.3. These groups, Content; Device; and
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Network, represent user data stored on the device; device status data; and
network data, respectively.
Category Information
Content Calendar
Contacts
Audio
Video
Image
Files
MMS & SMS
Call log
System settings
User dictionary
Device Device ID
Online accounts
Power state
System alarm
Device location
Telephony services
Network MAC Address
Proxy settings
Network Status
Network connectivity
Network usage
history and statistics
Table 2.3: Types of personal data in each category.
Figure 2.4 provides a graphical representation of the number of apps
that access the various types of personal data (RQ1). According to these
results, device status data, marked as “Device”, such as device id, noti-
fications and power information, etc., as shown in Table 2.3, is accessed
by almost all apps. Further examination revealed that 75% of the apps
request device location. Similarly, network information is of interest to
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65% of the apps. What is alarming here is that over 70% of the apps read
“Content”, which carries sensitive personal information.
Content Network Device Location
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Figure 2.4: Type distribution of personal data collected by the analyzed apps.
2.6.2 Contacted Servers
The static analysis and the dynamic analysis module extracted, in total,
135 K and 21 K valid URLs/IP addresses, respectively. The number of
URLs extracted by the static analysis module is much more as compared to
those extracted by the dynamic analysis. The disparity in these numbers
further endorses that static analysis provides an over-approximation of the
program and extracts URLs which might not be contacted in an actual pro-
gram execution, whereas the dynamic analysis extracts only those URLs
which are contacted by the app in a single run. However, the presence of
any of these URLs in the executable of an app provides a potential data
transfer point and cannot be ignored. Since the purpose of dynamic anal-
ysis is to widen the analysis range, we use a combination of the URLs/IP
addresses extracted by both the modules. Figure 2.5 illustrates the value
of the dynamic analysis module to the static analysis results; where the red
line shows the number of URLs found in a particular app and the blue line
represents the number of new unique URLs discovered only by dynamic
analysis in the same app. For certain apps the number of new URLs/IP
addresses discovered by the dynamic analysis in comparison to the static
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Figure 2.5: This graph shows that how effective is the dynamic analysis technique in
covering the blind spots of the static analysis technique.
analysis is much higher than the others possibly because of heavy use of
reflection.
It is important to mention here that the relation between servers and
URLs is one-to-many, i.e., on each server there can be multiple resources
represented by different URLs. Therefore, the number of servers an app
contacts is considerably less than the number of URLs.
Moreover, PDTLoc could extract data flow paths only for a portion
of all the URLs due to known limitation of static and dynamic analysis.
Therefore, we divide the servers into two groups, i.e., those which are
involved in an observed data transfer and those which are only contacted.
Figure 2.6 provides the number of servers and apps for which at least a
personal data transfer is observed. Overall for 505 (34%) apps, transfer
personal data is observed among which 295 (20%) of the apps transfer
personal data outside the EEA. Similarly, 401 servers are the recipients of
data transferred by these apps among which 213 are located outside the
EEA.
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Figure 2.6: Number of servers and apps engaged in actual data transfer
2.6.3 Server Locations
Figure 2.7 illustrates the distribution of locations for servers engaged in
the transmission of personal data (RQ2). As it reveals, only 23% of the
servers are hosted in the EEA and the majority of the servers (67%) is in
the US. Therefore, it is expected that the major portion of personal data
to travel outside the EEA.
67% 23%
2%
2%
4% United States
Europe
China
Hong Kong
Russia
Japan
Others
Figure 2.7: The distribution of the locations to which the European users’ personal data
collected by mobile apps travels.
The main focus of this work is to provide a location analysis of the
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Figure 2.8: The target countries per apps.
servers contacted by the apps in our dataset. Figure 2.8 shows a graphi-
cal representation of the country-wise distribution of servers based on the
number of apps. It illustrates that a reasonable portion of the apps contact
(observed and potential data transfer) servers outside the EEA and US,
especially China, Japan, India and Russia.
As most of the analyzed apps contact servers outside the EEA, it is
interesting to know the number of apps transferring data only to a cer-
tain location/country. In this regard, Figure 2.9 illustrates the number of
32
CHAPTER 2. PDTLOC 2.6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
0 200 400 600 800 1,000
EEA
US
EEA+US
Others
12
892
232
0
# apps
Figure 2.9: The number of apps that transfer the personal data exclusively to the EEA,
US and other locations.
apps exclusively contacting servers located in the EEA, US, EEA & US
and any other country. It shows that none of the apps perform exclusive
data transfer to servers located outside the EEA and US. Only 12 (less
than 1%) apps contact servers located only inside the EEA. In contrast,
the number of apps contacting servers exclusively in the US is reasonably
higher, i.e., 892 apps. This implies that most of these apps either belong
to the US-based companies or having their data centers located in the US.
Similarly, the number of apps exclusively contacting servers in the EEA &
US is 232. A similar reasoning applies to these apps as well where the apps
either communicate to servers in the US or their local counterparts in the
EEA.
2.6.4 Privacy Discussion
The new agreement between the EU and the US, the EU-US Privacy Shield,
provides stronger obligation on the US based companies dealing with EU
personal data. However, similar to the Safe Harbor, the EU-US Privacy
Shield also control only a portion of the entities (service providers, apps)
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Figure 2.10: The apps that do not provide
any privacy policy.
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Figure 2.11: The apps providing privacy
policy.
involved in personal data collection/transfer to US and other countries.
Figures 2.10 and 2.11 depict the results of the analysis we have done on
the mobile apps’ privacy policy and terms of use. More than half of the
most used apps in Europe, 51%, do not provide any privacy policy as shown
in Figure 2.10. They simply do not tell their users what they do to the
personal data they collect and where they store and process them.
In the app analysis, we observed that 7% (108) of the apps transfer per-
sonal data outside the EEA while do not provide any privacy policy; thus,
this is a violation of the DPD’25.1 regulation (RQ3). Moreover, the analy-
sis results reveal that 50% of the apps contact servers (potentially transfer
personal data) outside the EEA and since these apps do not provide a
privacy policy, they should anyways be considered suspicious.
Among all the apps providing privacy policy (49%), we observed that
13% transfer personal data to the non EEA based servers (e.g. , the US,
China, Russia, etc.) while only 3.5% of them holding safe harbor certifi-
cation (Figure 2.11). We concludes that 9.5% (134) of the apps certainly
violate DPD’25.1 (RQ3) since users did not provide consent for those in-
ternational data flows, and the available privacy policies are transparent
about the data processing locations. Additionally, when we consider the
apps which do not provide privacy policy and transfer personal data out-
side EEA 7% (108), in total, we confirm that 16.5% (242) of the analyzed
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apps violate this regulation.
One of the major challenges for the Privacy Shield Agreement is that
even if we assume that its enforcement will be practical, it will cover only
a small portion of mobile apps dealing with European users personal data.
The European Data Protection watchdogs would need to have a more
proactive role in inspecting compliance with the Data Protection Regu-
lations, in particular for widely used mobile apps.
2.7 Data Location Enforcement on Mobile Devices
There are three approaches to enforce jurisdiction policies on mobile phone:
modifying the framework, repackaging apps, and hook APIs at run time.
Since the two former approaches are quite costly and not practical in wide
range usage, we choose the third category of approaches. Such approaches
basically hook the APIs at runtime in order to allow the monitoring the
data collection and data transfer activities of the app.
We design a module on top of Xposed framework [91] which intercepts
the APIs transferring data to remote servers and analyzes their destination
location by using the service provided by PDTLoc. This module then
enforces the given jurisdiction policies on the device at the run time.
2.7.1 Xposed
“Zygote” is a process which is the heart of the Android runtime. Every
application is started as a copy (“fork”) of it. The process start is done with
/system/bin/app process, which loads the needed classes and invokes the
initialization methods.
This is where Xposed comes into play. It copies an extended app process
executable into /system/bin on installation. This extended startup pro-
cess adds an additional jar, which is called “Xposed Bridge”, to the
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Figure 2.12: An overview of the jurisdictional policy enforcement mechanism on device.
classpath and calls methods at certain places. When an app launches,
this jar file is executed in the very beginning of the process. It enables
Xposed to “hook” method calls and inject a custom code before and after
methods.
2.7.2 The Enforcer module designed on top of Xposed
Figure 2.12 illustrates an overview of the jurisdiction policy enforcement
mechanism on an android based device. As the figure shows, Xposed
Bridge is in between the app and the framework. It receives a list of
APIs in order to intercept them. When the app calls an API, 1 , Xposed
Bridge intercepts it if it is in the list and forwards it to the API handler
module, 2 . API Handler performs pre-call or post-call executions in order
to read or modify the parameters and the results of the called API. More-
over, it extracts the name/IP address of the server to which the incoming
data is being transfered, and passes it to the Location Investigation
module in order to determine the location of the remote server. Then the
location of the server is compared against the given jurisdiction privacy
policies and if there is a compliance, it proceeds the call, 3 , otherwise
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the call is dropped and logged. The Xposed Bridge forwards the call to
the framework and receives the results, 4 , 5 . Then it sends the received
results to the API Handler module again for further modification/logging
if necessary, 6 and finally the results are forwarded to the app, 7 , 8 .
2.8 Improving Transparency and Compliance
A number of actions are necessary to improve the control over trans-border
personal data flows. It is important that the data protection authorities
in Europe demand transparency from the application providers about the
location of the data processing. This needs to be explicit in privacy poli-
cies. It is vital to clarify which parties have access to personal data and
for which purpose. In our study, we observed some applications transfer-
ring sensitive personal data items to multiple servers across the globe. In
addition to the jurisdictional issue, as all countries do not offer the same
level of privacy protection to individuals, it is not possible to state that all
those servers belong to the data controller, or even if the data controller is
aware of them. Data Protection Authorities (DPAs) need to be proactive
in protecting the privacy rights of individuals, by identifying international
data which is not compliant with the regulations and agreements in place.
The market place provider needs to make privacy policies mandatory, that
is the minimum acceptable action that Google, Apple and Microsoft need
to take, to mention the main companies who control mobile application
marketplaces today. Ideally, the apps should display certification seal,
but it is possible to go further. Research on machine readable and auto-
mated privacy policy enforcement has shown it is possible to offer more
transparency and control to data subjects [9, 11, 17]. Moreover, the mar-
ketplace must have a mechanism to promptly remove applications signaled
as non-compliant by DPAs or by the users. Furthermore, it is not difficult
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to implement user notification features on the mobile OS, such that users
can remove those non-compliant applications from their devices. On the
other hand, it is extremely hard to reclaim the data that has already been
leaked.
We are planing to provide PDTLoc as an online service. End-users, mar-
ketplaces and security agencies can utilize such service to perform privacy
analysis of mobile apps.
2.9 Limitations
PDTLoc determines the physical location of the remote servers by employ-
ing a third party service e.g., IPAddressAPI.com; thus, it relies on the
information provided by this service.
Our server location analysis of the apps is based on the 1st hop server
and do not consider if the personal data might be transferred to another
server, e.g., App1 transfers data to abc.com and then the data is transferred
from abc.com to xyz.com. In this case, PDTLoc only considers the transfer
of data to the 1st server. It is impossible to trace data transfer once they are
released to a server without collaboration of the target server. Furthermore,
the mere transfer of the data towards another jurisdiction without explicit
consent by the data subject and for which no international agreements are
in place, already represents a violation. Therefore, PDTLoc only considers
the transfer of data to the first hop server. Moreover, some applications
might behave differently depending upon the location of the device they
are running on. Since we have performed dynamic analysis in only one
location (i.e., Italy), there is no guarantee about the behavior of such apps
elsewhere.
The source and sink APIs considered in this work is a representative list
of APIs which can be used by apps to retrieve personal data and transfer
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it over the network. However, there are other methods to receive personal
data and transfer it outside which is not considered in the analysis, e.g.,
apps can coordinate with each other to acquire and transfer data. Fur-
thermore, we focus on only benign apps rather than malware that usually
employ more sophisticated and stealthy methods to exfiltrate personal in-
formation.
The data flow paths extracted by the static analysis module only indi-
cate the existence of potential personal data transfer in the app, but do not
ensure if the app actually transfers personal data outside. However, even
the existence of such data flow paths enables the app potentially violate
DPD’25.1 and are, therefore, flagged in this work.
2.10 Related Work
Literature shows a number of research publications and tools which try to
solve the problem of privacy leakages in Android apps. They focus on a
wide range of private user data and are based on different strategies. Here
we briefly discuss some of them in the context of our problem.
2.10.1 Static Privacy Leak Detection
A number of static analysis approaches have been proposed in literature
which can serve to detect privacy leakage in Android apps. Based on the
model of the Android framework, CHEX is an approach that performs
data flow analysis to detect component hijacking vulnerabilities [60]. In
principle, the same approach can be used to detect also privacy leakages.
Scandal [57] tries to detect leakage of private information, such as lo-
cation information and phone identifiers, using media including Network,
Files and SMS. It is based on identifying data flow using abstract semantics
of the applications. Although, it provides a concrete representation of the
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data flow, it consumes a lot of resources and would therefore suffer from
performance and scalability issues.
Androidleaks is a WALA based solution to detect privacy leakages in
Android apps [36] [48]. It uses a system dependence graph to perform taint
analysis.
Based on bytecode analysis of Android apps, DroidAlarm is a tool de-
signed to counter privilege escalation by detecting capability leaks [97]. It
uses control flow graphs to detect and extract capability leak paths from to
sensitive sources to public interfaces. However, it only supports Android
2.2 which is quite outdated.
AmanDroid is an inter component-data flow analysis framework for An-
droid apps [85]. It is an extensible tool implemented in Scala and based on
an intermediate representation of Dalvik bytecode. Amandroid performs
data flow analysis by constructing an inter component data flow analysis
graph. It provides a plugin for taint analysis which captures data flow
between various sources and sinks of information. The sources and sinks
are easily configurable in Amandroid’s taint analysis plugin. Theoretically,
these sort of tools are ideal for detecting privacy leakage. However, we
practically tried it on some apps and it could not detect some very obvious
data flows.
Bodden et al. presents, Flowdroid, one of the most sophisticated static
analysis tool for Android [8]. It is a Soot based tool which performs data
flow analysis on a representation of Java bytecode called Jimple [82]. They
also publish a benchmark of applications, known as DroidBench, which can
be used to test data flow analysis tools.
Epicc is another static analysis tool which focuses on privacy leakage
considering inter component communication and inter app data flows [68].
They provide a cover for privacy leakage between various components of
an app and among multiple apps, which most of the static analysis tools
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do not consider. To make it a complete package, Didfail and IccTa are two
other tools which combine Flowdroid and Epicc [15] [59]. They utilize the
object/field/context sensitivity of Flowdroid and the inter-component data
flow detection Epicc to construct superior tools. This chain of static analy-
sis tools, however, is based on Soot that was designed for Java applications
and some times fails to analyze Android apps.
As a matter of fact, some of these static analysis tools capable of detect-
ing privacy leakage can be adopted to be used in our work. However, we
preferred performing analysis on Smali code as it provides a direct repre-
sentation of the Dalvik bytecode. Therefore, we used an extension of SAAF
that performs analysis on Smali code and is based on backward program
slicing of apps. The extension of SAAF overcomes some of its limitations,
such as handling data flow through intents.
2.10.2 Dynamic Privacy Leak Detection
As static analysis usually suffers from over-approximation and, therefore,
a higher number of false alarms, dynamic analysis solutions provide the
answer.
SmartDroid detects sensitive APIs in an app, creates a static activity
switch path and control flow paths leading to these sensitive APIs and
dynamically executes these paths to generate trigger inputs which could
be used to detect privacy leakage [96]. They rely on instrumentation of
framework services to ensure dynamic execution.
TaintDroid is one of the most widely cited tools in Android dynamic
privacy leakage detection [30]. It is based on tainting sensitive information
and tracking it towards sensitive sources. Similarly, Droidbox is another
tool which detects privacy leakage in Android apps by executing them in
an emulator [27]. However, such tools require a dynamic triggering solution
to effectively execute portions of the code that leak private information.
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To counter this problem, some tools provide their own triggering solu-
tion along with privacy leakage detection, e.g., AppsPlayground, AppIn-
tent, etc. [74, 93].
However, most of these tools still suffer from code coverage issues and
increasing the code coverage when analyzing Android apps is an open re-
search problem. Moreover, Shauvik et al. performed an analysis based
study of the state-of-the-art open sourced test input generation tools for
Android applications [19]. Surprisingly, random exploration strategies
based tools performed far better than the other model based and system-
atic tools.
Since even the more sophisticated tools do not yield considerable im-
provement in the code coverage and unnecessarily complicate the pro-
cess, we use the standard application exerciser provided with the Android
SDK,i.e., the Monkey tool, in the dynamic analysis module.
2.11 Chapter Summary
This chapter introduces a substantial contribution in the analysis of trans-
border personal data flows. It is a major debate that may impact how
the regulatory framework around the digital economy will evolve. We have
highlighted the main concerns in personal data transfers by in principle
non-malicious applications, and shown a considerable number of them fail
to comply with the EU personal data protection regulation, in the first
study of the kind, up to our knowledge. While PDTLoc has been suitable
in this case, we believe it can be extended to analyze other information
flow properties as well.
This work is interviewed by CNIL, the French National Commission of
Information Technology and Liberty, and they wrote an article about PDT-
Loc which is publicly available here: https://linc.cnil.fr/where-does-all-data-go.
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VLOC: An Approach To Verify The
Physical Location Of A Virtual
Machine In Cloud
In this chapter we introduce an approach, named VLOC, to verify the phys-
ical location of a virtual machine on which the data controller applications
and the collected data from end users are stored. VLOC is implemented
as a software tool which is able to estimate the geolocation of itself and
notify the corresponding user if the location is unauthorized. VLOC uses
a number of arbitrary web-servers as external landmarks for localization
and employs network latency measurement for distance estimation. Due to
the fluctuation in the network latency, VLOC employs a machine learning
technique in order to adapt itself to various network latency tolerance.
3.1 Introduction
According to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST),
one of the essential characteristics of cloud computing is resource pooling
which allows cloud service providers (CSPs) to serve multiple consumers us-
ing a multi-tenant model by dynamically assigning resources on consumers’
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demand [63]. Cloud service provisioning is independent of the location of
the provider, as the services are consumed over the Internet. CSPs wish to
be free to relocate data for load balancing purposes in order to reduce the
maintenance cost. However, knowing and controlling the physical location
of data for storage and processing is a the key requirement for enforcement
of the jurisdictional regulations. Moreover, it could be very important for
organization (e.g. data controllers) using Cloud in some particular sce-
narios dealing with compliance [3]. Due to lack of appropriate monitoring
mechanisms, a piece of sensitive data may be transferred amongst various
data centers situated in different geographical locations, and consequently
there might be violations in data privacy as there are various regulations
for privacy protection in different countries.
Since data controllers need to guarantee that the country where the pro-
cessing occur has an adequate level of protection to the rights and freedoms
of the individuals from whom the data was collected, they would benefit
from a service that could verify the physical location of their data/vir-
tual machines. There are a number of approaches for finding the physical
location of a piece of data or a host. Generally, they take advantage of
network metrics such as round trip time delay for a transmitted message
between two identical hosts and then calculate the distance or the physi-
cal location of one of hosts based on the measured latency from the other
ones. The main drawback of this approach is dynamicity of the internet.
As the network load changes frequently in time, it is not possible to find
a constant correlation between network latency and physical distance. In
addition, there are other factors which impose delay on a transmission such
as authentication mechanisms, network delays, proxying, caching, and so
on. Therefore, an adaptive approach is required to deal with the dynamic
environment of the Internet.
In this chapter we introduce a geolocation approach, named VLOC (a
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Verifier for physical LOCation of a virtual machine), which is able to verify
the physical location of a virtual machine by taking advantage of nearby
randomly chosen web-servers. Since VLOC does not rely on a network of
fixed landmarks, its implementation is easier and maintenance cost lower
than other proposed solutions. VLOC is implemented as a software com-
ponent which needs to be installed and initialized on a virtual machine.
3.2 Related Work
Peterson et al. in [72] introduced the idea of combining the concept of In-
ternet geolocation with Proof of Retrievability (PoR) for data localization.
GeoProof is an implementation of such an idea [3]. It uses a tamper-proof
physical component installed in the local network of cloud servers. As this
component is GPS 1 enabled, it is able to recognize its own location. In
addition, GeoProof employs a PoR protocol [54] by which it challenges the
storage servers. The information gathered from the PoR protocol and the
physical component enable it to verify the location of a piece of data.
The major drawback of GeoProof is the requirement of a tamper-proof
and GPS enabled device situated inside the local network of each data
center. Cloud providers may hesitate to adopt such solutions as it may leak
sensitive information. In [4] GeoProof is enhanced by reducing the required
computational overhead and improving its accuracy, but the mentioned
drawback remains unresolved.
As distance bounding protocols such as [75, 41, 72, 3] use network
latency for distance calculation, they are quite time critical. Therefore,
network fluctuation significantly decreases their accuracy. Network laten-
cies can be imposed by network equipment and servers. Such latencies can
not be distinguished from message transmission latency. Hence, distance
1Global Positioning System
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bounding protocols suffer from lack of accuracy in dynamic environments
such as Internet. Gondree and Peterson proposed a schema to tackle such
problem by employing a latency function built based on the current network
traffic observation [37]. In their schema, there are a number of landmarks
which observe the network traffic by transmitting a number of messages
amongst themselves and then build a model based on that. The main dis-
advantage of this approach is the requirement of a dedicated network of
landmarks which is quite costly. Moreover, in the model building phase the
landmarks send messages amongst themselves in order to find a baseline
for the Internet delay which does not quite represent the real environment.
In fact, this scenario does not consider the latencies imposed by cloud me-
diation services such as authentication, decryption, etc. Therefore, the
observation has an inherent error which influences the distance estimation.
DLAS provides a data localization assurance service based on crypto-
graphic foundations that allows cloud users to select the preference re-
garding data location [65]. In order to provide such service, DLAS uses
a Zero Knowledge System (ZKS) protocol to maintain secrets and verify
them as mentioned in the Service Level Agreement (SLA) between parties.
In DLAS, the CSP (called enterprise in that paper) is trusted and uses
an external cloud storage service and guarantees not to move user’s data
according to her location preferences. The storage provider (SP) prepares
a list of all data centers with their physical locations and informs the CSP
once a piece of data is moved. Employing ZKS protocols enables the CSP
to verify the region of a particular data center and prevents the CSP from
violation of the data location preferences policies. Since DLAS does not
use any external resource for geolocation and relies on logical characteris-
tics of data centers, it is vulnerable to be bypassed by virtualization. A
copy of network topology of all data centers (i.e. empty virtual machines
and settings) can be stored on each data center and a piece of data can be
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moved amongst them without awareness of DLAS. Our approach, VLOC,
does not suffer from this kind of attack.
Massonet et al. introduced a system which monitors data transfers by
making collaboration between cloud infrastructure provider and the service
provider (i.e. user) [61]. In this system, data controller (i.e. tenant or cloud
customer) is able to specify required locations for a piece of data allow-
ing to be processed and the system prevents moving data to unauthorized
locations. However, its major drawback is providing such a monitoring
service only at infrastructure level. Therefore, it does not cover data items
with finer granularities. This drawback is resolved by another work [26].
It introduces a vast monitoring framework being able to collect evidences
about data transfers in various service levels. Basically this framework em-
ploys a dedicated monitor for each of service layers including SaaS, PaaS,
and IaaS. Each monitor tracks the API calls related to data transferring
and stores required logs. Furthermore, in order to track the movements
of a piece of data in various layers, this framework keeps a map amongst
different granularities for the data. This framework is promising; however,
there is an assumption which says the CSP wishes to demonstrate compli-
ance; therefore, it does not move user’s data without authorization. This
assumption is quite reasonable as there are many ways to make a copy of
data without having authorization. However, restricting the known ways
of copying and transferring data and employing a geolocation technique
mitigate the risk of illegal data transferring. Due to this assumption, CSP
provides a list of all data centers with their physical locations. In our
attack model, we assume that the CSP is not trustworthy as its goal is
to minimize maintenance costs by moving resources to less expensive data
centers.
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3.3 VLOC
The user can install the VLOC on her virtual machine and once the tool
gets initialized, it notifies the user the physical location of the virtual ma-
chine. VLOC does not need a dedicated physical device nor a network of
pre-arranged landmarks. The main requirement of VLOC is the availabil-
ity of an online IP geolocation service like [50, 62], to get a list of websites
like Alexa 1-million [5] and the current geolocation of the virtual machine.
First, the tool chooses a, configurable, number of random websites (agreed
with the CSP at the moment user buys its cloud hosting service) and then
starts to collect geolocation information about them. Then, it can verify
at any moment, the geolocation of the virtual machine.
3.3.1 System Model
In the following we describe the main ingredients of the geolocation system
in which VLOC verifies the location of a virtual machine.
• The list of websites; A database of websites addresses. For instance,
these addresses can be collected from Alexa [5].
• The VLOC tool; it is a software component installed on a virtual
machine to verify its physical location. VLOC includes a Data Col-
lector component which collects the required geolocational informa-
tion for every website. The IP location service provides geolo-
cational information of the web-server of a particular website. The
Round-Trip-Time (RTT) measurement module, which mea-
sures the network latency between current virtual machine and a tar-
get web-server by sending multiple HTTP requests to the website
hosted on that web-server. The number of HTTP requests can be
specified through a parameter passed to this module. Finally, the av-
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erage value of round trip time of the successful requests is returned as
a result.
• The target virtual machine; This is the virtual machine that needs
to be securely geolocated and on which the VLOC tool is installed.
The virtual machine holds data as well web services users want to run
on the cloud.
• Current host; it is the physical server on which the virtual machine
is running.
• The distance estimation function which maps each RTT value to
a distance between the pair of associated hosts. This function is a
polynomial function and its coefficients are variable and updated dur-
ing the initialization of the VLOC tool. The value of coefficients are
calculated based on collected data and their corresponding measured
RTT values. Therefore, the function is able to estimate the distance
between two identical hosts based on former observations.
• The learning module calculates the coefficients of the distance es-
timation function by finding the correlation between measured RTT
values of two identical hosts and their associated distance. This mod-
ule attempts to find the best function approximation which represents
the collected data.
• The triangulation technique; this is a technique used to specify
the physical location of a point by having the latitude and longitude
coordinates of at least three nearby points. This technique is used, in
our model, to estimate the physical location of the current host based
on three nearby web-servers. The technique is explain in details in
the next section.
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Figure 3.1: Triangulation for specifying the physical location of a host by knowing the
physical locations and distances from other nearby hosts.
3.3.2 Determining the Physical Location of A Virtual Machine
To find the physical location of a server on which a virtual machine is in-
stalled, a feasible solution is to take advantage of quality of service metrics
used in networks. In [72], multiple trusted landmarks with known physical
locations are used. The distance between a landmark and a data center is
obtained by sending specific messages and measuring transfer delay with a
an error below a chosen threshold. At least three landmarks are required
to achieve the required accuracy in triangulation procedure.
Computing the location of a point by triangulation
Computing the location of a point, px, on a surface is possible when we
have the locations of at least three nearby points, {p1, p2, p3}, and their
distance from px. As Figure 3.1 illustrates, if we draw a circle with the
center of each point and the radius of their distances (d1, d2, d3) from px, all
the circles meet each other at px. By finding their intersection point, we can
determine the location of px. This technique is called “Triangulation” [90]
or “Trilateration” [87].
Before we utilize triangulation technique, we need to consider that since
Earth is not a surface rather a sphere, the location of objects on earth is
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represented by the latitude (φ) and longitude (λ) values which are defined
in polar system. The latitude of a point is the angle between the equatorial
plane and the straight line that passes through that point and through
(or close to) the center of the Earth. The longitude of a point is the
angle east or west of a reference meridian to another meridian that passes
through that point [88]. In order to calculate the intersection points of the
circles, we convert this coordination into the Cartesian system by utilizing
Equation 3.1 and for the reverse operation, Equation 3.2.
x = λ. cos(φ)
y = λ. sin(φ)
(3.1)
λ =
√
x2 + y2
φ = tan−1(
y
x
)
(3.2)
We write the equation of a circle in the following form:
(x− xi)2 + (y − yi)2 = d2i i = 1 . . . n (3.3)
where (xi, yi) indicates the center of the circle (the location of the i
th device
in our system) and di its radius, which is the distance between the server
and the device. In order to find intersection point of multiple circles, we
do it two by two i.e. in pairs. However, before trying to find intersection
of two circles we have to figure out if they touch each other. Suppose that
we have two circles i, j; if we draw a line between the two centers (dij),
compare its length with the radii (di and dj) and employing the triangle
existing conditions [89], we can conclude that whether those circles can be
used for our purpose or not. We obtain the distance between the centers
of two circles by measuring their Euclidean distance as the following:
dij =
√
(xi − xj)2 + (yi − yj)2 (3.4)
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The situation of the two circles is determined by the following condi-
tions:
• dij <
√
(di − dj)2 : One circle is inside the other so there is no inter-
section.
• dij > di + dj : The circles are too far apart to intersect.
• dij = di + dj : The circles touch at a single point.
• dij < di + dj : The circles touch at two points.
If two circles touch at least at one point, we subtract their two equations,
in 3.3, to get the line equation. By solving that subtraction the following
equation is yielded which determines the intersection point(s):
(x, y) =
1
2
(xj + xi, yj + yi) +
d2i − d2j
2dij
(xj − xi, yj − yi)
±1
2
√
2
d2i + d
2
j
d2ij
− (d
2
i − d2j)2
d4ij
− 1(xj − xi, yj − yi)
(3.5)
In order to compute the location of a point, this equation is applied on the
locations of at least three nearby points and yields the intersection point
which equals to the location of the first point.
Estimating Distance
The most important factor in determination of the location by triangula-
tion is the distance of landmark points (hosts) with our virtual machine.
The virtual machine sends HTTP requests to three hosts and measures
the round trip time delay. Then, based on measured delays, distance from
every host is estimated and by utilizing a triangulation technique, the phys-
ical location of the host on which the virtual machine is installed will be
computed.
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As mentioned before, VLOC needs an initialization which consists of
three phases. The first phase is to collect geolocational information of the
given list of websites. Algorithm 1 shows the procedure of data collection.
This algorithm takes a list of websites, an online IP geolocation service,
and the location of the current host (the virtual machine) and then finds
the physical location of web-server of each website and calculates the dis-
tance between the web-server and the current host and stores them into
a database. The second phase of initialization, which is depicted in Algo-
rithm 2, is measuring the round trip time (RTT) delays of websites. This
algorithm takes the list of websites, a range of operation which signifies
the radius of a circle showing a geographical zone, and a confidence factor
and then it measures the RTT value of an HTTP request for every website.
As using long distances increases the error rate of distance estimation, our
approach limits its range of operation to the nearby websites and in Algo-
rithm 2 the range of operation refers to choosing websites situated in range
of R KMs. Due to probability of failure in the requests and the delay of
packet routing imposed on some requests, this algorithm takes a parameter
named confidence factor C which repeats the HTTP transmission opera-
tion C times for each website and finally the average of successful HTTP
requests is used. Since after initialization phase the physical location of
the current host needs to be verified and the only trustworthy entity is net-
work delay measurement, it is required to provide a function which maps
an RTT value to the corresponding distance. Having distance from at
least three hosts enables the current host to calculate its physical location
by making use of a triangulation technique. Therefore, the last phase of
initialization is to prepare a function being able to estimate the physical
distance between the current host and an arbitrary host.
The distance estimator function, in VLOC, employs a distance bounding
protocol in order to calculate distance between two geographical points
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Input: L: list of websites; IPG: reference of IP geolocation service; H: current
host information;
Output: L′: List of websites with their collected geolocation information;
1 L′ = new List();
2 for ( w in L) do
3 g = IPG.getInfo(w);
4 d = distance(H, g);
5 r = {w, g, d};
6 add r to L′;
7 end
8 return L′;
Algorithm 1: The data collection algorithm.
based on their measured RTT value. The following equation shows a simple
distance calculator:
f(x) = a.x (3.6)
where x is the given RTT value and a is a coefficient that converts the
value of a round trip time delay to its corresponding distance. Unfortu-
nately, due to dynamicity of packet transmission in the Internet, it is not
possible to consider a constant coefficient for the distance estimation func-
tion. Moreover, the hierarchical architecture of cloud does not allow the
protocol to work properly as in order to transmit and process a request,
the request needs to pass through various service layers. In addition, each
layer imposes an extra delay on the process and the number of participated
service layers is vary per different types of requests. Therefore, in order to
estimate the transmission latency of a request, it is not possible to consider
a global constant coefficient for the distance calculation function. Thus, a
technique is required being able to adapt itself with various circumstances
and handle different delays in the distance calculation procedure. VLOC
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Input: L′: List of websites with their geolocation information;
R: Range of operation;
C: Confidence factor;
Output: L′′: List of chosen websites with measured RTT;
1 L′′ = new List();
2 for ( r in L′) do
3 if ( rd < R ) then
4 for i = 1 to C do
5 Send an HTTP request to rw;
6 tstart = Now();
7 Wait for respond from rw;
8 res = The received response;
9 tend = Now();
10 if ( res was successful) then
11 ∆ti = tend − tstart;
12 end
13 end
14 rtt = 〈∆t1...C〉; // Average
15 rec = {w, rtt};
16 add rec to L′′;
17 end
18 end
19 return L′′;
Algorithm 2: Measuring and collecting round trip time (RTT) latencies of the nearby
websites.
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uses the following equation:
f(x) =
n∑
i=0
aix
i (3.7)
in this equation the coefficients are variable and they are updated according
to the observation performed by Algorithm 2. This algorithm chooses a
random subset of websites from the list and measures the RTT values for
them and then updates the coefficients. In order to provide an accurate
observation, a sufficient number of websites must be used (e.g. at least 500
websites). Therefore, the algorithm is able to cover the regular turbulences
happening in the network as depicted in Figure 3.2, the coefficients do not
face abrupt changes; they stay in a limited range.
Figure 3.3 illustrates an example of the distance estimation function.
As this figure shows, each item (i.e. website) has an RTT value and a cor-
responding distance from the current host. The coefficients of the function
are obtained by applying a machine learning technique (i.e. Polynomial
Regression [86]) on the collected data. The function shown in this figure is
an example of trained function which is able to perform distance estima-
tion for further RTT values. Therefore, employing this technique enables
us to handle the dynamicity of the Internet environment.
An interesting question might arise here, since the environment of the
cloud computing is changing in time the distance estimation based on one
time observation might not be accurate enough. In fact, this is likely to
be true because network and host conditions may be different at the time
of observation and at the time of estimation. Therefore, there must be a
short time gap between observation and estimation. However, the size of
this gap depends to the fluctuation of latency of the network. In order to
maintain the accuracy above an accepted level, the observation needs to be
performed periodically. In fact, while the estimation function is being used,
the coefficients can be updated frequently and provide better accuracy
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Figure 3.2: An observation on the changes of the coefficients of Equation 3.7 during the
update process captured 20 times. These results show that choosing a random subset of
websites for each update, does not lead to very different coefficients.
Figure 3.3: A sample of collected RTT values versus distances and the trained function
representing the distance estimation procedure.
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Figure 3.4: The initialization process. The process of frequently updating the coefficients
of the distance estimation function is illustrated in this figure.
based on the most recent observations. In order to utilize such a technique,
we need to perform the observation procedure in every predefined time
slot; and then update the coefficients based on them. The entire process
is depicted in Figure 3.4.
Once the initialization phase is finished, the distance estimation function
is ready to be used. In order to verify the location of current host (virtual
machine), at least three nearby websites get selected and then by making
use of the mechanism employed in Algorithm 2, the RTT value for those
hosts are measured. In the next stage, the distances between current host
and the selected websites are estimated by utilizing the distance estimation
function. Finally, as illustrated in Figure 3.1, the geolocation of current
host is obtained.
The presented approach can be integrated into various techniques and
schema in order to be used in various application. For instance, it can
be integrated into a proof of retrievability service (PoR) such as [3, 54,
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55, 66, 72] or into a data transfer monitoring framework such as the one
introduced in [26]. Moreover, it can be used as a notification service on
transferring a specific piece of data to an unauthorized physical location.
3.3.3 Security Considerations
Alternative approaches to ours use a network of pre-arranged landmarks,
situated outside of the target host, as verifiers. They send challenge mes-
sages to the host and measure the RTT values and finally estimate the
physical location of the host. All these approaches however, require an
external network of landmarks.
In contrast, our approach puts the verifier inside the target host, remov-
ing in this way the requirement of an organized network of landmarks. In
VLOC, the physical location is estimated by sending message from the tar-
get hosts to existing websites, rather than from some specified landmarks
to the target host.
This however, opens security issues that VLOC needs to address. Since
VLOC is in the virtual machine hosted on the cloud, a mistrusted cloud
provider could intercept and manipulate all communications between VLOC
and the websites. Encrypting the messages is not a solution, since the en-
crypting key would reside on the cloud and can be extracted from the
RAM by the cloud provider. Our solution to this problem is to obfus-
cate the communications VLOC performs for the purpose of estimating
the distance within the regular traffic of applications stored on the virtual
machine. The reasoning behind this choice is that the cloud provider could
not easily filter out or block these messages and a full packet inspection
would be required. Since in our threat model the cloud provider moves
data only for the purpose of saving money, breaking our system would
simply require more effort than what gained by moving the data.
Therefore, VLOC does not use fixed landmarks, easy to blacklist, but
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rather randomly chosen websites as external landmarks. In order to mea-
sure required RTT values, we use normal HTTP requests which would be
difficult to block without affecting other applications. The cloud provider
sees the virtual machine sending an HTTP request to some websites like
what many applications do for REST requests or SOAP ones.
An other possible point of attack is the list of websites VLOC will
query. Rather than embedding a fixed list in VLOC software, the user can
configure online and dynamically at her will the address of the IP-location
service VLOC uses to gather list and location of the candidate websites.
The size of the list and the number of selected website can be configured
dynamically as well.
3.3.4 Limitations
Although VLOC is promising in a practical environment, there are a num-
ber of limitations need to be considered. One of the limitations is related
to detection of network latency changes (i.e., due to network disruption).
This may have an impact on the accuracy of the estimated location. While
an adaptive monitoring module capable of such detection is under develop-
ment, at the moment VLOC adopts the strategy of periodically repeating
the measurements. The frequency of such confirmation is a parameter can
be configured dynamically.
Furthermore, there are two other parameters in VLOC need to be tuned
in order to achieve the best accuracy. Those parameters which are the
range of operation, R, and the confidence factor, C, impact on the amount
of noise in the measured latencies and consequently on the accuracy of the
geolocation estimation procedure. The confidence factor plays a crucial
role in the measurement phase as it attempts to handle the fluctuation of
the network while the duty of the range of operation is to filter out far
web-servers. Since long distances overwhelm the impact of short distances
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in training, they reduce the accuracy of geolocation estimation as it is
demonstrated in Figure 3.8.
As the cloud provider is considered as an adversary, it can perform
some operations to reduce the accuracy of VLOC. For instance, it can
inject packet delays on all outgoing and incoming traffic. These delays
could be recorded, or they could be randomly generated. At the time of
injecting these delays, VLOC faces a slight reduction in accuracy, however,
since VLOC observes the environment frequently and adapts itself with
the network turbulences, it can get adapted to the such a situation. The
cloud provider is agnostic to the purpose of outgoing and incoming packets
as VLOC packets are exactly regular HTTP requests. Furthermore, if the
cloud provider performs such an operation, it impacts the quality of the
service which is an important key in cloud business.
3.4 Empirical Setup
In order to evaluate VLOC, we developed it in form of a web-based tool
in PHP/MySQL which collects the data and executes the training and
accuracy measurements. The target host is a computer in Trento, Italy
and the goal is to estimate the geolocation of this computer.
This section explains the data collection process and describes the data
used. It also describes the evaluation measures, the experimental results
and their analysis.
3.4.1 Data Collection
As mentioned before, the initialization phase needs to collect geolocational
information and measure RTT latencies of a number of randomly chosen
websites. In order to do so, we used Alexa 1-million [5] list from which
the geolocational information of 188, 644 websites were collected. We have
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Figure 3.5: The number of used landmarks (websites) per various ranges. Each range
refers the maximum distance between the landmarks and the current host.
used IPaddressAPI.com [50] as the IP-location service. This operation is
performed by Algorithm 1. After collecting such information, we selected
38, 892 websites which were geographically located in the vicinity of 1000
KM radius. We measured the RTT values of these website by employing the
Algorithm 2. Figure 3.5 illustrates the number of these websites (used as
landmarks) in various ranges. The confidence factor for this measurement
was set to 10, which means for every website 10 HTTP requests were sent
and the average of successful ones was stored as the corresponding RTT
value. The HTTP requests used in the experiments were sent through a
PHP function named fsockopen [73] which initiates a socket connection to a
resource in network. We used this function to open a connection to a given
website address on port 80 referring to the port of HTTP protocol. Since
the application only opens a socket and does not download any web-page,
it acts resembling a ping request over HTTP protocol.
3.4.2 Evaluation Measure
Since the main purpose of VLOC is to verify the location of a virtual ma-
chine, the evaluation measure must be able to verify the distance between
the actual physical location of the machine and its estimated location. We
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used error of average distance estimation defined in the Equation 3.8 for
accuracy evaluation.
Eavg =
1
N
N∑
i=1
‖p(i)e − p(i)o ‖ (3.8)
where N is the number of data instances participating in test phase, p
(i)
e
denotes the estimated physical location for ith website in the list and p
(i)
o
is the observed geolocation (the real physical location) for that website.
Finally, Eavg refers to the calculated average error in KM .
In order to provide a comprehensive evaluation, we evaluated the ap-
proach with different websites which is achieved by applying random com-
bination of measured RTT values. We used cross validation technique [42]
to perform such a combination by using 10 fold 5 times setting which works
as follows. First, the collected data is divided into 10 parts called folds.
Out of these 10 parts, 9 are used to construct the estimation function. The
remaining 1 fold is used to evaluate the constructed function. Then the
data items get shuﬄed and the same division and evaluation is repeated
for 5 times.
3.4.3 Accuracy
In this section the accuracy of location estimation is discussed. In order
to estimate the physical location of a server, first we need to estimate
the distances of at least three nearby hosts. The accuracy of distance
estimation makes a major impact on the accuracy of physical location
estimation (i.e. triangulation procedure). We also compare the accuracy of
VLOC with other distance measurement techniques which are GeoProof [3]
and distance calculation with the speed of light.
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GeoProof uses the following equation for its distance measurement:
f(x) =
1
2
x
4
9
s10−6 (3.9)
where x is the given RTT value, 49s is the measured speed of transferring
data over the Internet while s is the speed of light. This function f(x)
takes x in milliseconds and computes the distance in KM . Since there
is no accuracy evaluation experimental results provided by GeoProof in
their paper, in order to compare its accuracy with the accuracy of VLOC,
we applied GeoProof distance estimation formula on our measured RTT
latencies.
The other experiment is done by using speed of light in fiber as the
calculation parameter which would be as follow:
f(x) =
1
2
x(0.66)s10−6 (3.10)
As the speed of light in fiber is 66 % of the speed of light in vacuum, it
can be used as measure for distance calculation. However, this measure-
ment can be solely used in a high speed network with neither routers or
other kind of nodes in the middle. We consider it as a theoretical baseline.
VLOC provides a more realistic correlation between distance and observed
network latency over the Internet. VLOC builds a model representing
such a correlation and uses it for distance calculation. Since the model is
build based on observation of network latency regardless the type of net-
work environment, it is able to estimate the distance between two hosts
based on their message transmission latency. In addition, building a spe-
cific model for the current network and updating the model based on the
changes in the latency of the network enable it to handle the fluctuation of
the transmission latency. This is achieved by tuning the coefficients of the
estimation function, introduced in Equation 3.7, with the measured RTT
values. Figure 3.6 shows the impact of adaptive approach on the accuracy
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Figure 3.6: A comparison of various distance estimations done by VLOC and its rivals.
These results show the average of estimation error in various ranges.
of distance estimation and compares it with non-adaptive approaches.
Once the estimation function is constructed, VLOC will be able to ver-
ify the physical location of the current machine. In this stage we provide
the accuracy of geolocation estimation. The location of landmarks makes
a significant impact on the accuracy of localization in triangulation tech-
nique. Figure 3.7 illustrates this impact, which shows the current server
needs to be surrounded by the chosen landmarks and using randomly cho-
sen landmarks. Randomly chosen landmarks do not guarantee the best
accuracy. According to this fact, we performed the experiment of local-
ization estimation in two fashions including randomly chosen landmarks
and optimized ones. The results of these experiments are depicted in Fig-
ure 3.8. These results reveal that as the range of operation increases, the
optimized chosen landmarks outperform the randomly chosen landmarks.
According to the results shown in Figure 3.8, the best result for geolo-
cation estimation is obtained in range of 150 KM in which 162 landmarks
are participating. As the range of the operation grows, the accuracy of the
location estimation falls down. In order to utilize triangulation technique
in larger ranges, we need to draw larger circles which increases the risk of
estimation error. Thus, the landmarks situated in nearby are the best for
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(a) An example of extremely bad chosen
landmarks.
(b) An example of desirable chosen land-
marks.
Figure 3.7: Two observations of randomly chosen landmarks which can be perfect or can
give very different location estimation. The light red markers show the locations of the
selected landmarks, the blue marker is the current host (Trento), and the yellow marker
points to the estimated physical location of current host.
our purpose.
In VLOC, various factors impact on the accuracy represented by the
following statement:
Acc ∝ P × C
F
− ‖ d
dR
f(R)‖ (3.11)
where Acc is the accuracy, P is the frequency of performing RTT latency
measurement in order to keep an updated observation of the network la-
tency, C is the confidence factor used in Algorithm 2, F refers to the net-
work fluctuation which is obtained by calculating the latency differences
of a number of HTTP requests transmitted between two identical hosts.
f(R) is a function representing the changes of accuracy based on changes
of range of operation, R. Small values of R (i.e. less than 100 KM in
our experiments) do not yield an accurate result because the number of
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Figure 3.8: Estimation error in localization per various ranges. This figure depicts the
results in two landmark selection styles which are optimized and random selection.
landmarks in small ranges are not sufficient. On the other hand, as Fig-
ure 3.8 shows, there is an optimum point for R and increasing this value
after that point makes a negative impact on the accuracy. Therefore, in
this statement, the derivative of such a function is used.
3.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter presents an approach, named VLOC, for verifying the physical
location of a virtual machine without using a network of fixed external
landmarks nor a GPS enabled device. VLOC is implemented as a software
which is able to estimate the physical location of itself and notify the
corresponding user if the location is unauthorized. It allows a user to
install it on a virtual machine and after initialization it will be ready to be
practically used.
VLOC works inside of the target host (inside of the cloud) and does
not rely a network of fixed external landmarks; therefore, the implemen-
tation cost is quite negligible. All a user needs to do is to install it as a
tool on his/her virtual machine and then initialize it. However providing
a geolocation service by using a tool installed inside the cloud while the
cloud provider is the major adversary brings an important security issue.
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Since cloud provider has control over the infrastructure, platform, and the
network, he is able to modify the real measurements with fake information.
Our strategy against such an attack is to use random websites as exter-
nal landmarks and obfuscate our messages into a regular protocol such as
HTTP. In this scenario, there is a significant cost for the cloud provider to
filter the network traffic and modify the information.
The experimental results demonstrate that VLOC is accurate enough
for being used in practice. Moreover, it can be integrated into a monitoring
framework in order to track a piece of data or into a policy enforcement
engine as a policy information point in XACML architecture [67].
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Distributed Auditing for Data
Location Compliance in Cloud
In this chapter we introduce a framework, named DLoc, which enables the
end-users to track the location of their data after being transferred to the
cloud. DLoc does not require a network of monitoring servers (landmarks)
and does not need to reside and/or run within the cloud. It uses a proof
of data possession technique to guarantee that the cloud storage service
possess the particular file and estimates its location(s) in a distributed
manner without requiring the collaboration of the data controller or cloud
provider.
4.1 Introduction
Steadily increasing data volumes and the rising dependency of business and
social life on data ubiquity have led to massive growth of cloud storage ser-
vices such as Amazon S3, DropBox, or Google Drive. These services allow
users to store their data on remote servers independently of geographical
location. Cloud storage services utilize a federation schema by maintaining
data at different providers which then distributes and replicates the data
among different cloud storage providers. This reduces vendor lock-in and
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increases data availability through additional redundancy.
Applying such federation schema can raise issues with compliance re-
quirements. Especially the transparent data distribution and replication
on the provider-side limit the user’s direct control over data flows which
lead to potential violations of compliance constraints. Personal data, for
instance, sometimes must not leave a particular jurisdiction while the dis-
tribution in such a case is reasonable in terms of availability, it clearly can
violate privacy compliance regulations such as the EU Data Protection
Regulation [71]. Russia 1 and China 2 are also imposing restriction on the
location of the data processing.
The approaches introduced to track a file in cloud are divided into two
major groups. The first group propose a schema requiring modification
of underlying cloud services and collaboration of cloud service providers.
The second group observes the environmental parameters (from outside
of the cloud) in order to estimate the location of a file in cloud. The
parameters include network delay, hop counts, mode of delay, median of
delay, standard deviation of delay, and population density. We used some
of these features in our previous work, VLOC.
The second group has a clear advantage since it does not require modi-
fying the underlying services; however, they require a wide spread network
of servers communicating to each other, pinging cloud storage servers and
monitor their data transfer practices. Having such network brings a signif-
icant cost to the tracking service. In VLOC, we designed and implemented
a technique which monitors the dynamics of the network delay of the cloud
service and builds a model out of it and keeps updating the model. It does
it through measuring RTT delay from servers which have two major char-
acteristics: a) they are chosen randomly, so cloud provider is not able to
1https://techcrunch.com/2016/11/17/linkedin-is-now-officially-blocked-in-russia/
2http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-40106826
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filter them; b) their physical location is known to VLOC. VLOC needs to
be installed on a virtual machine and be initialized with the actual location
of the data center; therefore, it can be used by data controllers to monitor
and verify the location of their virtual machine in cloud. Data owners need
to find the location of their data in cloud and VLoc does not provide such
service. In fact, we need a technique which does not require the collabora-
tion of cloud provider or data controller in order to monitor the location
of data from a client machine.
In this work, we propose a framework, named DLoc, which does not
require a network of monitoring servers and does not need to reside within
the cloud. The idea is to distribute the monitoring tasks to DLoc agents.
Each user who subscribes for the file tracking service participates in the
file tracking procedure as a DLoc agent by letting her phone to challenge
the cloud storage services and share her coarse-grained location with our
service. DLoc makes use of proof of data possession technique to guarantee
that the cloud storage service possess the particular file in question and
estimates the location of all copies of files publicly available in the cloud.
The major challenge is to minimize the number of messages going to and
coming from the DLoc agents while maximizing the accuracy of location
estimation. It achieves that by observing the environment and studying
the algorithms used in the system and provide a measurement to evaluate
the accuracy and performance.
4.2 DLoc
In this section, we explain how DLoc, Distributed Data Localization frame-
work, works. Figure 4.1 illustrates a general overview of DLoc and the
major steps required to track a file in cloud. There are four major entities:
• Data owner wants to upload a file into Cloud Storage B which is
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located in her country. She wants to assure that her file stays in that
region.
• Cloud Storages are the storage services used as backup storage and
file sharing platform.
• DLoc agents are actually other smartphone users who use cloud
storage services as well. They challenge a given target server and
collect network latency information.
• TPA is a third party auditor server, which coordinates the DLoc
agents and handles the file tracking procedure.
The data owner runs Algorithm 3 on her phone to upload the file. This
algorithm encrypts the given file with an encryption key generated by the
user’s device. Then, it produces a set of meta-data required by DLoc to
track the file securely.
Algorithm 3, first, encrypts the given file (F ) with the input key (k).
Then, it generates the hash value for each block of the encrypted file (hi).
The next step is to compute MAC (Message Authentication Code) for
each of hash values of the blocks (mi) with a randomly generated key.
Please note that this random generated key is the same for all blocks of
the given file (Msk). The encrypted file (Fc) is uploaded to the cloud and
the MAC values (M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mn}) along with the MAC key (Msk)
are published to the TPA. This procedure is shown by 1 in Figure 4.1.
When the data owner wants to track her file in the cloud, she queries the
TPA (shown by by 2 in Figure 4.1). The TPA runs the Algorithm 4 which
receives the list of DLoc agents (S), the number of required challenges (c)
and the file identifier (Fid) which specified in the query coming from the
data owner; and then it generates a list of challenge requests (R). The
parameter S does not contain all the DLoc agents rather a selected subset
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Figure 4.1: System Overview of DLoc.
Input: F : input file; k: encryption key;
Output: Fc: encrypted file; M : set of MAC codes for Fc blocks; Msk: MAC
encryption key;
1 Fc = Encrypt( F , k);
2 Msk = new RandomKey();
3 BFc = Fc.getBlocks();
4 for ( bi in BFc) do
5 hi = Hash(bi);
6 mi = MAC(hi, Msk);
7 end
8 M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mn};
9 return {Fc, M , Msk};
Algorithm 3: The data owner runs this algorithm on her phone in order to prepare
the file for upload and provide required metadata for the tracking procedure.
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of them. The selection policy is based on their availability, location, and the
number of requests they have performed already. The number of challenges,
c, is tunable; as its value grows the accuracy and also the overhead. The
algorithm, first chooses c random blocks (B) of the file, then chooses a
random member of DLoc agents and assigns a random block to it 〈si, ri〉.
In this setting, it is possible that a block is requested more than once and
a DLoc agents receives more than one request. Finally the TPA sends
each request to its corresponding DLoc agents, which is indicated by 3 in
Figure 4.1.
Input: Fid: file identifier; S: list of DLoc agents; c: number of challenges;
Output: R: list of challenge requests;
1 n = Fid.getNumberOfBlocks();
2 B = {b ∈ N|(bi = RandomNumber(0, n)
c
)
i=1
};
3 R = {};
4 for ( b′i in B) do
5 si = S.getRandomMember();
6 ri = new Request( Fid.getURL(), b
′
i);
7 R← 〈si, ri〉;
8 end
9 return R;
Algorithm 4: Preparing the challenge messages for broadcasting to the DLoc agents.
When a DLoc agent receives a challenge request from the TPA, it per-
forms the Algorithm 5 shown by 4 in Figure 4.1. This algorithm receives
a set of requests (R′), challenges the server and provides challenge re-
sults (CR) to the TPA. This algorithm has two major tasks. First, to
challenge the server whether it possesses the file or not. Second, to es-
timate the distance between the server and the DLoc agent in order to
provide information for distributed localization. In order to challenge the
server for the file possession, Since each request (ri) contain a file block
number, this algorithm queries the server for that particular block, then it
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computes the hash value of the block (hi). In the meanwhile it measures
the download time (∆ti) that will be used later for distance estimation.
The hash values and the measured round trip time (RTT) of the challenge
request are sent to the TPA for further analysis.
In Chapter 3, we demonstrate that there is a direct correlation between
RTT and physical distance; however, there are a number of parameters
involved which affect the accuracy. The major issue is that DLoc agents
are located in various locations and use different network bandwidths. In
order to mitigate the effect of the network variety, we take two approaches.
The first one is to use an off-the-shelf technique to observe the DLoc agent
network connection before challenging the server (Nspeed in Algorithm 5).
It uses an API provided by http://www.speedtest.net which encom-
passes a network of servers around the globe and finds a nearby server and
communicate a number of packages, then it provides an observation on
the network performance. The results of this API are useful to tune the
weights of the RTT values in order to mitigate the effect of different net-
work bandwidths on the estimation procedure. Moreover, due to network
load, the traffic goes through different paths which causes various network
delays; therefore, it lowers the accuracy of distance estimation based on
RTT. In order to tackle this issue, we employ a machine learning tech-
nique, to tune the wights of parameters and adapt the estimation to the
network fluctuation which is indicated by “NormalizeNet(Nspeed,∆t)” in
Algorithm 5.
Finally, each DLoc agent sends a set of the hashed value of each block (H),
normalized network measurements (N) and its location (L) to the TPA ( 5 in
Figure 4.1). The TPA collects all the information from the DLoc agents
and carries out two tasks: it verifies the challenges by running Algorithm 6
and determines the location of the server by executing Algorithm 7 which
is discussed later.
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Input: R′: subset of challenge requests;
Output: CR: challenge results;
1 H = {}; //Hash values of the blocks
2 Nspeed = Network.AnalyzeSpeed();
3 for ( ri in R
′) do
4 u = ri.getURL();
5 x = ri.getBlockNumber();
6 tstart = Now();
7 bi = download file-block #x from u;
8 tend = Now();
9 ∆ti = tend − tstart;
10 hi = Hash(bi);
11 H ← 〈x, hi〉;
12 end
13 N = NormalizeNet(Nspeed,∆t); //Network Measurements
14 L = DeviceLocation();
15 return {H,N,L};
Algorithm 5: Challenging the server.
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Since the TPA possesses the MAC values of all blocks and their key (Msk),
by receiving the hash value of each block (hj) is able to verify its integrity.
Algorithm 6 receives the file identifier (Fid) and all collected challenge re-
sults and evaluates them. Each challenge result consists of a pair of block
numbers and its hash value 〈xj, hj〉 which is retrieved from the server by
a DLoc agent. This algorithm first computes the MAC value of the block
number specified in the challenge result (m′j) then compares it with the
already stored MAC value for the same block (mj). By doing the same
procedure for all the received challenge results, we can verify the integrity
of the stored file with a certain level of confidence. The confidence level
depends on the number of challenge requests which may cause overheads.
Input: Fid: file identifier; CR: challenge results;
Output: verification result;
1 Msk = Fid.getMACkey();
2 for ( ci in CR) do
3 Hi = ci.HashValues();
4 for ( 〈xj, hj〉 in Hi) do
5 m′j = MAC( hj, Msk);
6 mj = Fid.getMACValue(block# = xj);
7 if ( m′j 6= mj) then
8 return “Integrity Error!”;
9 end
10 end
11 end
12 return “Verified!”;
Algorithm 6: Verifying the challenges.
4.2.1 Estimating the data location
Algorithm 7, named the localization algorithm, uses Equation 3.5 and
estimates the location of the data based on a set of given challenge re-
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sults (CR). Each challenge result contains the location of the DLoc agent
(center of the circle) and network measurement information to compute
the its distance from the server (the radius of the circle). This algorithm
estimates at least one location for the data. As the cloud storage provider
might create multiple copies of the data on various servers, this algorithm
handles this matter as well by determining the locations of all accessible
copies of data.
The localization algorithm, first, creates an empty list of points (P ).
Then, for each given challenge result, it computes the distance from server
by calling Distance() function. This function basically models the corre-
lation between network delay and distance using a polynomial regression
function, which is employed by VLOC as well [33]. The next major step
is to calculate the intersection points of the circle of the current challenge
results with the results received from the other DLoc agents. Then it ver-
ifies the circles and drops the ones which are not useful for localization
according to the conditions mentioned above. There is an exception to
this. Since in practice there is always a negligible error in distance estima-
tion, sometimes the circles are close to each other but just for few meters,
they do not match the condition. In order to overcome this issue, we de-
fine an error tolerance range parameter (ε) to compensate the error. The
algorithm finds all intersection points amongst all the given circles and
keep them in the P list. At the end, it determines the popular ranges (FL)
in which a considerable number of points are estimated. These popular
ranges indicate the location of servers storing the data.
4.3 Empirical Evaluation
To evaluate DLoc we run experiments on 4 android devices (playing the
role of servers) situated in four cities and in total, 1, 422 web hosts playing
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Input: CR: challenge results; ε: error tolerance range;
Output: FL: locations of the file;
1 P = new List();
2 for ( ci in CR) do
3 di = Distance( ci.Net()); //Network Measurements
4 li = ci.DeviceLocation();
5 for ( cj in CR ∧ j > i) do
6 dj = Distance( cj.Net());
7 lj = cj.DeviceLocation();
8 dij = ‖li − lj‖; //Euclidean distance
9 if ( dij <
√
(di − dj)2 ) then
10 continue; //Ignore j
11 end
12 if ( dij > di + dj ) then
13 if ( dij > di + dj + ε ) then
14 continue;
15 end
16 inc di, dj until dij ≤ di + dj;
17 report “ε is used”;
18 end
19 (p1, p2) = IntersectPoints(ci, cj);
20 P ← p1;
21 P ← {p2|p1 6= p2};
22 end
23 end
24 FL = A set of the most popular ranges in P ;
25 return FL;
Algorithm 7: Localization procedure.
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as DLoc agents. As we measure the round trip time value (RTT) such role
changing does not influence the final result.
We designed and implemented an android app to challenge the servers
and collect network delay measurements between each DLoc agent and the
nearby smartphone. Please note that in order to avoid confusion, we use
the same terminology that we have explained in the approach. In other
words, in the data analysis we do not consider this role changing.
This section explains the data collection process and describes the eval-
uation measures, the experimental results and their analysis.
4.3.1 Dataset Collection
In our settings there are four servers located in Trento, Turin, Eindhoven,
and Leuven and there are many DLoc agents challenging them. We par-
tially used the data collected in [33] including the address and location
of numerous landmarks situated near the mentioned cities. Each DLoc
agent challenges the server by utilizing an HTTP request for over 15 times
a day and measures the RTT values of each challenge. In the following
sections we analyze the data collected by DLoc agents and study the effect
of various factors on the final results.
4.3.2 Evaluation Goals
The experiments are designed to answer the following research questions:
• RQ1 Accuracy: How accurate is DLoc to estimate the location of
server hosting the file?
• RQ2 Environment: What are the parameters, such as number of
DLoc agents, distance of the agents from the server, etc., influencing
the accuracy of DLoc?
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Figure 4.2: The number of DLoc agents per range.
4.3.3 Evaluation Measure
As the main task of DLoc is to determine the location(s) of an uploaded file
(data) in the cloud, to evaluate it, the distance between the actual physical
location of the machine where data resides and its estimated location. We
used error of average distance estimation defined in the Equation 4.1 for
accuracy evaluation.
Eavg =
1
N
N∑
i=1
‖pie − pio‖ (4.1)
where N is the number of executions of the test, pie denotes the estimated
physical location of the server (cloud storage) in the ith test pio is the
observed location (the real physical location) for that server. Finally, Eavg
refers to the calculated average error in KM .
We evaluated the approach with challenges generated by various DLoc
agents that spread widely around the servers. In order to provide a com-
prehensive assessment we apply a random value combination. We used a
slightly modified version of cross validation technique [42] to perform such
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a it. We trained the system with 80% of the data and test with the re-
maining 20%. The operation was repeated for a 1000 times by shuﬄing
the data each time. Moreover, we used the same setting for all 4 different
servers situated in 4 cities.
4.3.4 Results and Discussions
The results of the experiment composed of 1000 runs in each of the four
cites, i.e., Trento, Turin, Eindhoven, Leuven, are aggregated in Figure 4.3 (a-
d), respectively. Figure 4.3 shows the actual location of the file hosting
cloud servers, location of the surrounding DLoc agents and the location of
the server hosting the file as estimated by DLoc. On the map shown in
the figure, the red, yellow and blue markers represent the actual location,
the estimated location and the location of the DLoc agents. As shown
in the figure, DLoc estimates the location of the server with a reasonable
degree of accuracy, i.e., the estimated location is within 92 KM of the
actual location for the Trento node, 153 KM for the Turin node, 45 KM
for the Eindhoven node and 20 KM for the Leuven node (RQ1). Table 4.1
summarizes the results for each city.
Eindhoven Leuven Trento Turin
Min error (KM) 22.25 16.54 70.06 134.38
Max error (KM) 47.39 33.92 219.32 295.54
Standard deviation (KM) 2.22 2.02 30.67 30.54
Table 4.1: The summary of the results for each city.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the average error of the location determination
for various number of challenges. As the results in this figure show, for
the servers located in Eindhoven and Leuven, increasing the number of
challenges does not have a significant impact on the estimation error while
for the other two servers specially Turin, a notable change can be observed.
While one of the reasons is the sparsity of DLoc agents around each server,
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(a) Eindhoven (b) Leuven
(c) Trento (d) Turin
Figure 4.3: Screen shots of DLoc estimating a file on the four servers situated in multiple
cities. The light red markers show the locations of the DLoc agents, the blue marker
indicates the actual location of the server, and the yellow marker points to the estimated
physical location of the server.
we also study the influence of distance, between the agents and the server,
on the accuracy.
To study the influence of distance on the accuracy of location estima-
tion (RQ2), we unitized the distance into multiple ranges and performed
experiments on all DLoc agents situated only in each individual range. Fig-
ure 4.5 illustrates the results of such experiment. As it shows in the range
of 20− 40 KM , only in Leuven there are a number of agents surrounding
the server and sent 320 challenges while there is no agent until the range
of 140 − 160 KM where the number of challenges increased and the ac-
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Figure 4.4: GeoLocation error estimation per various number of challenges.
curacy slightly declined due to the distance. The similar steady move is
observed for Eindhoven for the ranges of 60− 80 KM , 100− 120 KM and
140 − 160 KM . Turin and Trento have a bit different story; their closest
agents are in the ranges of 140− 160 KM and 200− 220 KM respectively.
Moreover, the number of challenges in these ranges are quite small (20 and
85) compare to what the servers located in Eindhoven and Leuven expe-
rience in their closest range. These two reasons explain the yielded lower
accuracy for Turin and Trento. Therefore, not only the number of DLoc
agents influences the accuracy, also their distance from the servers has a
notable effect. Which means, the closer to the server the agents are, the
less number of challenges is required to track data effectively.
It worth to mention that the obtained results even for Turin and Trento
are acceptable as the main usage of DLoc is to monitor the enforcement
of jurisdiction regulations which, at its finest granularity, limits the data
to boundaries of a country. Moreover, it can have other usage as well
including quality of service measurement.
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challenges sent from the DLoc agents in the corresponding range.
4.4 Security and privacy analysis
DLoc does not require the cloud storage provider (CSP) to modify their
systems. When DLoc is running, all the CSP can realize is that a user
shares her files with a number of other users and the other smartphones
(DLoc agents) participating in geolocating the file are chosen randomly and
can be anywhere near the server or elsewhere; therefore, the CSP is not
able to impose a fake delay on the responses of the challenges it receives.
In order to bypass DLoc, there are two possible scenarios. The first
one is to break into the TPA which handles the challenges, DLoc agents
and prepares the results. The second scenario is to register a huge number
of smart devices (DLoc agents) in the TPA and make them to collude
with each other to prepare a fake delay time and fake location. Both
scenarios are quite expensive for the CSP to perform. Therefore, the cost
of compliance is negligible compare to bypassing DLoc.
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4.5 Limitations
Although DLoc is promising in a real world application, there are a number
of limitations need to be considered. The first limitation is dependency to
the number of DLoc agents and their distance to the target server. If there
is not enough DLoc agents in less than about 400 KM of a server, the
accuracy of DLoc will fall down.
Moreover since the cloud provider is considered as an adversary, it can
inject random delays to the outgoing traffic to reduce the accuracy of DLoc.
As the location of DLoc agents are considered as trusted, such random
delay can yield different measurement by each agent and increase the es-
timation error. However, the strength point is that by doing so the cloud
provider practically cuts its quality of service; therefore, abusing such lim-
itation is costly for the could provider.
In practice, integrating DLoc to the current cloud storage providers
(e.g. Amazon, Google drive, etc.) without modification of their systems
imposes another limitation on the user. In fact, the data owner must share
the file with the other users (giving them access to the file), even if it is
encrypted for them to challenge the servers, it is still a limitation.
4.6 Related Work
In the literature, there are a number of approaches to determine the loca-
tion of data in cloud. Some focus on providing a cloud infrastructure which
is able to handle the enforcement of data location policies which certainly
require hardware and/or software modification in cloud services. Recently
studies have drawn their attentions to finding the correlation between the
network delay and geographic distance which then can be used to deter-
mine the location of an Internet node. Here we review both groups briefly
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with more emphasis on the second group as its more close to our work.
4.6.1 Server side data geolocation
Krau and Fusenig propose an approach utilizing a Trusted Platform Mod-
ule (TPM) on host platforms for data geolocation in clouds [58]. They
assume that a certification authority stores the location of a host with its
TMP’s identity. Then, the owner of a virtual machine requests a certifica-
tion of the host in order to transfer data. They also assume that all virtual
machines implement a “LocCheck” client which is able to communicate
with a “Location verification and integrity check” module implemented in
the hypervisor. This solution requires administrative methods to perform
the verification of the location. Moreover, it is costly and due to the variety
in cloud platforms, it is not able to prevent data replication in arbitrary
locations.
Paladi et al. introduce a high-level architecture in cloud storage systems
for a trustful location-based mechanism for data transfer control [70]. Fu et
al. use a TPM to provide a strong validation of cloud data geolocation [35].
These approaches require the modification of underlaying layer of cloud
services which are quite costly and difficult to be adopted by cloud providers.
4.6.2 Delay based data geolocation
Geoping assumes that the hosts with a similar network delay are at the
same location [69]. Basically, Geoping challenges the target server from a
number of known landmarks and builds a set of path-delay information.
To find the location of an unknown target server, it constantly pings the
server from the landmarks at known paths and uses Euclidean distance
and finally chooses the landmark with the best match.
Constraint-based geolocation employs multilateration, which is used by
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DLoc as well, where each landmark draws a circle around itself with a
radius of the distance to the target server [40].
Topology-based geolocation improves the accuracy of Constraint-based
geolocation by taking into account the network topology and using the re-
lationship between latency and distance in order to estimate the distance
between two Internet nodes [56]. It basically transforms the geolocation
problem into a convex optimization problem with constraints and solves
the problem to find the location of the target. A more recent work [18] en-
hances the same concept for geolocation which attempts to find the nearest
common router and related landmarks to the target node, introduce de-
viations to landmarks and consider their locations as areas, calculating
relative delay between landmarks and target node. Then it defines the dis-
tance as constraint conditions to estimate the real deviations of landmarks
and the location of the target.
Yong et al. introduce a three layer geolocation algorithm, which em-
ploys a large database of landmarks, their relative distances and delay
measurements [83]. The first layer is basically a constraint-based geolo-
cation algorithm which finds the area where the target server is situated.
The second layer employs the distance constraint-based method and uses
the primary landmarks in the area to shrink the possible area. Then, the
target is mapped to a near landmark discovered in the secondary area.
Benson et al. discuss how to determine the location of data in cloud
storage which spread in diverse locations [12]. They assume that the lo-
cations of all data storages are known, that the cloud provider has no
exclusive Internet connection between the data centers and that for each
data center, there is a trusted third party node located geographically close
to it. The proposed approach uses a distance measurement between the
data centers to determine the location of the data centers where the user’s
data is stored. They evaluated their work in Planet Lab network. However,
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the assumptions are too strong or expensive for a real world application.
Furthermore, the work does not recognize multiple copies of data.
In order to reduce cost, IGOD selects a small subset of landmarks with
their optimal position based on the diversity parameter [51]. Although the
authors even achieved a better accuracy compare to the similar previous
works, it still needs a network of fixed landmarks (e.g. Planet Lab) which
is difficult to implement in practice.
Watson et al. demonstrate that verifying the location of data in a cloud
storage has a limited accuracy [84]. They show that a collusion of the
cloud provider with a number of malicious host makes it impossible for
users to verify the location of their file accurately. The main drawback of
this approach is that it requires a set of trusted landmarks exists in order
to verify the existence of a file on a host.
GeoProof combines a proof of retrievability scheme with a delay based
protocol to determine the distance between a host and a verifier [3, 4].
They assume a tamper proof GPS device in the local network of cloud
provider communicating with a third party to verify the location of data.
The major drawback of this protocol is that cloud providers are not willing
to have a black box attached to their local network. Moreover, the GPS
signals received by the device can be faked by a malicious cloud provider.
Gondree and Peterson proposed a schema to tackle such problem by
employing a latency function built based on the current network traffic
observation [37]. In their schema, there are a number of trusted landmarks
which observe the network traffic by transmitting a number of messages
amongst themselves and then build a model based on that. The main dis-
advantage of this approach is the requirement of a dedicated network of
landmarks which is quite costly. Moreover, in the model building phase the
landmarks send messages amongst themselves in order to find a baseline
for the Internet delay which does not quite represent the real environment.
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In fact, this scenario does not consider the latencies imposed by cloud me-
diation services such as authentication, decryption, etc. Therefore, the
observation has an inherent limitation which influences the distance esti-
mation.
Abdou et al. show that having a fixed network of landmarks can be
manipulated [1]. The location of landmarks will be revealed over time
and since usually delay based approaches use UDP or ICMP protocols,
an adversary is able to filter them out and play with the delays of the
responses in order to misrepresent its own location. DLoc does not suffer
from this issue due to two reasons: a) The location of landmarks used by
DLoc is not fixed as the landmarks are portable devices. b) DLoc uses the
same protocol that the cloud storage provider uses to serve the clients and
basically an adversary is not able to differentiate between the real user and
a landmark.
There is a parallel work with DLoc which uses network delays and a
network of smartphones to estimate the physical location of a server [21].
However, the focus of DLoc is to estimate the location of data (e.g. a file)
in the cloud. It verifies the server for the possession of user’s data and
tracks all available online copies of the file on all servers. Moreover, the
best error rate reported in their study is 189 KM while the average error
rate for DLoc in Leuven and Eindhoven is less than 50 KM and for Turin
and Trento less than 150 KM . DLoc proposes a comprehensive framework
which adapt itself automatically by observing the environment and remove
noisy data.
4.7 Chapter Summary
This chapter introduces DLoc, which determines the location of a file trans-
ferred to the cloud. which determines the location of a file transferred to
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the cloud. It uses a proof of data possession technique to guarantee that
the cloud storage service possess the particular file and estimates its loca-
tion(s) in a distributed manner without requiring the collaboration of the
data controller or cloud provider. DLoc has a number of advantages com-
pare to its rivals. First, it does not require a dedicated network of trusted
landmarks which makes it quite economic to be used in a real world setting.
Second, it does not require a modification to the cloud services. Third, it
is able to deal with multiple copies of data. Fourth, employing machine
learning techniques has made DLoc robust against network fluctuations
and various types of connections. Finally, since it uses smartphones in-
stead of fixed landmarks, it has motivation for DLoc agents to use the
service and participate in the process.
In a real-world scenario where DLoc serves a huge number of smartphone
users, therefore it is able to find the locations of data centers precise enough
in order to report all the data centers in the world representing a physical
risk to all cloud providers. Moreover, since DLoc provides measurements
and statistics on where data is stored and how long does it take to be
delivered, it can be used to measure the quality of service for content
delivery to mobile users and help to improve it.
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Chapter 5
Migration to industry,
standardization bodies and open
sources communities
In this chapter we discuss the relevance, effect and the contribution of our
work to industry.
5.1 Introduction
Demonstrating compliant privacy management practices has never been
this relevant for businesses. The EU General Data Protection Regulation
(EU GDPR) imposes considerable fines (up to 4% of the global annual
turnover) to organizations that fail to comply with the new framework
effective in May 2018. Two of the most important points of the regulation
features are new responsibilities for data processors (who process personal
data on behalf of other organizations) and new constraints of trans-border
data flows, in particular with the emergence of a new EU-US agreement on
the topic, the Privacy Shield, replacing the Safe Harbor agreement, which
was invalidated in 2015 by the EU Supreme Court of Justice.
These two characteristic greatly impact cloud platform providers, such
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as SAP. First, they most often play the role of data processor, directly or
indirectly, since customers (the actual data controllers) subscribe to the
cloud offers in order to reach their business goals. Second, the individuals
from whom data is collected have a number of rights according to the
regulation, including limitation of personal data across borders and/or to
third parties.
Meanwhile, cloud services often rely on geographically distributed data
centers across the globe for increased access speed and resilience. Moreover,
cloud platforms are designed for extensibility – via mobile applications and
further SaaS build over the platform services. The extensions are often
driven by a network of partner solution providers. In many of the cases,
they may also process personal data. In such a context, it is fundamental
cloud providers and customers, to have tools to enforce and to monitor
personal data flows in the cloud.
The work carried out in this PhD addressed questions related to data
processing location in the cloud:
• VLOC (a Verifier for physical LOCation of a virtual machine), which
is able to verify the physical location of a virtual machine by taking
advantage of nearby randomly chosen web-servers. Since VLOC does
not rely on a network of fixed landmarks, its implementation is easier
and maintenance cost lower than other proposed solutions. VLOC
is implemented as a software component which needs to be installed
and initialized on a virtual machine. Moreover, it can be used as a
background service of a virtual machine or a container.
• DLoc (Distributed auditing for Data LOCation compliance in cloud),
which determines the location of a file uploaded in cloud and all its
publicly available copies. Since DLoc employs the mobile devices as
its agents to challenge the server and verify the possession and the
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location of the file, it distributes the computation overhead and the
cost amongst a significant number of mobile devices. Therefore, as
there is no need for a huge network of landmark server, it is quite
economic to implement. Moreover, another advantage of DLoc is that
cloud storage service providers do not need to make any modifications
in their systems.
• PDTLoc (Personal Data Transfer LOCation analyzer), which em-
ploys both static and dynamic analysis techniques to infer whether
the apps violate DPD’25.1. PDTLoc inspects mobile applications and
extracts information about the collected personal data and the juris-
dictions of the remote servers to which the data is transferred. PDT-
Loc provides the capacity for treating a large number of applications
on reasonably short time.
In the following we discuss the potential impact of these works from an
industrial perspective.
5.2 Industry (SAP)
SAP not only provides software, but also hosts personal data collected by
its customers in the cloud. One of the main decision factors for customers
to adopt cloud services is trust. Exploiting VLOC in the context of SAPs
cloud services would provide increased transparency to customers with
respect to the data processing locations for SAPs data centers, those of its
subsidiary companies (Successfactors, Ariba, Concur) and of its partners.
More visibility on critical risk factors for customers is needed overall in
order to acquire more cloud customers, especially those who are cloud
averse nowadays.
Moreover, SAP also needs to assess the data transfer flows for its own ap-
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plications. By demand of SAPs management, we run PDTLoc on all SAP
official mobile apps (in total 60 apps in November 2016). We made the
results available internally to the SAPs Data Protection Office. PDTLoc
has potential for further exploitation as a testing framework for mobile ap-
plications, with a focus on information flow analysis, which is particularly
suitable for asserting privacy compliance properties. This is interesting for
SAP, who regularly publishes new mobile apps, or releases new versions of
it. PDTLoc can also serve as a blueprint for large scale privacy analysis
of applications in general. It can be well-suited for checking privacy fea-
tures of third-party applications and platform services (e.g. provided by
partners).
It is worthy mentioning that we also had a meeting with CNIL1, the
French National Commission on Informatics and Liberty, and presented
PDTLoc tool and its capabilities in order to see how it can be used to
protect the rights of citizens from their point of view. The constraint they
have is that they are not able such technology to prove non-compliance in
principle, because they need to prove we did not change the behavior of
the apps. However, they can use this tool to detect the suspicious behavior
of the apps in terms of data collection and data transfer which can be used
to request the data controllers (the app owners) to provide compliance
evidences.
5.3 Standardization Bodies
Standardization was not one of the goals for the current topic, however, the
results are relevant for standardization organizations and for certification
agencies. ISO and other bodies (ETSI, ENISA, and Cloud Security Al-
liance) are updating their standards and recommendations after the adop-
1https://www.cnil.fr/en/home
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tion of the EU GDPR, often these are based on improvement life cycles
that involve the adoption of tools. As a matter of fact, the EU GDPR
suggests the creating of privacy certification seals and codes of conduct by
industry associations and similar entities. The certification mechanisms
and codes of conduct must be approved by a supervisory authority. On
their turn, services and software will be awarded a seal if they prove ad-
herence to the terms of the certificate in question. Tools like VLOC and
PDTLoc can greatly accelerate the deliverance of such certification seals.
There is a sign of interest about such uses for this technology. After
the appearance of the PDTLoc article we were contacted by one of the
directors the French Data Protection Authority for presenting the work to
their team.
5.4 Open-source Software
The prototypes developed here rely on a large number of open source com-
ponents. Some examples are the APK tool, SAAF (Static Android Analysis
Framework for Android apps) and Monkey (created by google). It may be
interesting to consider to release to full frameworks as open sources com-
ponents, if it fits SAPs exploitation strategy. This depends on potential
emerging business model (for instance for partner app certification) and
approvals from SAPs legal department.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
In this dissertation, we introduce a substantial contribution in the analysis
of trans-border personal data flows and enforcement of jurisdictional regu-
lations over that. It is a major debate that may impact how the regulatory
framework around the digital economy will evolve. We have highlighted
the main concerns in personal data transfers by in principle non-malicious
applications, and shown a considerable number of them fail to comply with
the EU personal data protection regulation, in the first study of the kind,
up to our knowledge. While PDTLoc has been suitable in this case, we
believe it can be extended to analyze other information flow properties as
well.
To address the issue of server side compliance, we design VLOC which
verifies the physical location of a virtual machine without using a network
of fixed external landmarks nor a GPS enabled device. VLOC is imple-
mented as a software which able to estimate the physical location of itself
and notify the corresponding user if the location is unauthorized. There
are a number of approaches using distance bounding protocols to verify
the physical location of a host, but as mentioned in Chapter 3, they are
suffering from high implementation and maintenance cost or they are quite
non-feasible or non-practical. In contrast, VLOC runs inside of the target
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host (inside of the cloud) and does not rely a network of fixed external
landmarks; therefore, the implementation cost is quite negligible. However
residing within the cloud while the cloud provider is the major adversary
brings a number of challenges which we have overcome.
In order to enable end-users to track the location of their data after
being transferred to the cloud, we propose DLoc framework which does
not require a network of monitoring servers and does not need to reside
and running within the cloud. It uses a proof of data possession technique
to guarantee that the cloud storage service possess the particular file and
estimates its location(s) in a distributed manner without requiring the
collaboration of the data controller or cloud provider.
In this thesis, we have proposed a bundle of approaches in order to
enforce and monitor the jurisdictional regulations on mobile apps. Since
collecting and transferring personal data to a remote server composes of
multiple elements (e.g. mobile devices, mobile apps, data controller and
cloud service provider), we introduced a bundle of tools and frameworks
to monitor the data transfer in various levels. Implementing such bundle
is quite economic compare to rival approaches; however, for some parts of
the work, to best of our knowledge, there is no other approaches.
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